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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation untersuchen wir verschiedene Aspekte der datenzentrierten
Sicherheit. Insbesondere betrachten wir die attributbasierte Verschlu¨sselung (ABE),
ein kryptographisches Primitiv, das es erlaubt, Dokumente mit Policies u¨ber
Attributen zu verschlu¨sseln, so dass die Entschlu¨sselung nur fu¨r solche Subjekte
mo¨glich ist, deren Attributsmengen die Verschlu¨sselungspolicies erfu¨llen.
Das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist zu zeigen, auf welche Weise datenzentrierte
Sicherheit in praktischen Anwendungsgebieten einsetzbar ist. Hierzu erweitern wir
zuna¨chst ABE fu¨r dynamische und verteilte Szenarien, indem wir die sogenannte
Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption (DABE) einfu¨hren. DABE erlaubt es
nicht nur, dass Subjekte ihre Attribute inkrementell u¨ber die gesamte Laufzeit des
Systems anfordern (anders als bei konventioneller ABE, wo alle Attribute eines
Subjekts gemeinsam angefordert werden mu¨ssen); es ist dadurch auch mo¨glich,
dass diese Attribute von einer beliebigen Anzahl voneinander unabha¨ngiger At-
tribute Authorities bereitgestellt werden, von denen jede ihr eigenes Universum
von Attributen verwaltet. Wir stellen zwei Konstruktionen fu¨r das DABE-Schema
vor. Eine davon ist zusa¨tzlich effizienter als jede andere heute bekannte ABE
Konstruktion.
Die zweite Innovation dieser Arbeit ist ein neuartiges Konzept, das die Privatheit
in ABE verbessert, indem es Verschlu¨sselungspolicies versteckt. Um dies zu
erreichen fu¨hren wir den Begriff der Policy-Anonymita¨t ein, definieren ihn formal
und diskutieren ihn. Mithilfe einer Methode aus der Graphentheorie zeigen wir
anschließend, wie ein hoher Grad von Policy-Anonymita¨t in der Praxis erreicht
werden kann, indem man eine bekannte ABE-Konstruktion erweitert. Die komplette
erweiterte Konstruktion wird vorgestellt und ein Sicherheitsbeweis wird gefu¨hrt.
Wir bescha¨ftigen uns außerdem mit konkreten Anwendungsmo¨glichkeiten fu¨r
ABE. So entwickeln wir ein DRM-Framework, das ABE nutzt, um den Prozess
der Lizenzerzeugung zu vereinfachen und dabei gleichzeitig die Anforderungen an
die Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit zu verringern. Anschließend beschreiben wir ein Tool,
das in der Lage ist, kryptographisch erzwingbare Komponenten aus Policies zu
bestimmen, die in der Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) beschrieben sind.
Zum Schluss der Arbeit demonstrieren wir wie ABE in Service-Orientierte
Architekturen (SOA) integriert werden kann. Hierzu identifizieren wir die relevanten
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Web Service Standards und erweitern diese, um durch ABE geschu¨tzte SOAP
Nachrichten zu unterstu¨tzen. Ferner beschreiben wir die Implementierung von Web
Services, die zur Umsetzung eines vollsta¨ndigen DABE Frameworks notwendig sind.
Dadurch wird ein Framework ermo¨glicht, das genutzt werden kann um bestehende
SOAs so zu erweitern, dass sie die verbesserten Sicherheitsgarantien erfu¨llen ko¨nnen,
die durch datenzentrierte Sicherheitstechnologie ermo¨glicht werden.
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Summary
In this thesis we examine several aspects of data-centric security. In particular, we
take a look at Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), a cryptographic primitive that
allows to encrypt documents with policies over attributes and allows decryption
only by parties possessing sets of attributes that satisfy the encryption policies.
Our primary goal is to show the applicability of data-centric security to practical
scenarios. We first extend ABE to dynamic and distributed settings, introducing
what we call Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption (DABE). DABE not only
allows parties to claim their attributes incrementally throughout the lifetime
of a system (unlike conventional ABE where all attributes must be claimed at
once), but also supports these attributes to be managed by an arbitrary number
of independent attribute authorities, each of them having control over its own
universe of attributes. We give two constructions of DABE schemes, one of which
is also more efficient than any ABE scheme known today.
Our second contribution is a novel concept that improves privacy in ABE by
hiding the encryption policy. To this end, we introduce, define and discuss policy
anonymity. Using an idea from graph theory we then show how a high degree of
policy anonymity can be achieved by extending a known ABE construction. The
complete construction along with security proofs is given.
We also discuss how ABE can be utilized in practical settings. We develop a
new DRM framework using ABE that offers a simplified license creation process
while requiring less trust. We then describe an extraction tool that is able to
determine cryptographically enforceable components of policies in the Open Digital
Rights Language (ODRL). Finally, we demonstrate how ABE can be integrated
into Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), showing how common Web Service
standards can be used to support ABE encrypted SOAP messages and describing
implementations of web services to build a complete DABE framework. This
resulting framework can be used to extend existing SOAs in order to support the
improved security guarantees offered by data-centric security technology.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Emerging ubiquitous computing environments need flexible access control mech-
anisms. With a large and dynamic set of users, access rules for objects cannot
easily be based on identities, and the conditions under which access to an object
is granted need to take into account information like the context and the history
of a subject. Due to these shortcomings of traditional access control mechanisms,
cryptographically enforced access control receives increasing attention.
One of the most promising approaches is Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07]. In this scheme, users possess sets of attributes
(and corresponding secret attribute keys) that describe certain properties. Ci-
phertexts are encrypted according to an access control policy, formulated as a
Boolean formula over the attributes. The construction assures that only users
whose attributes satisfy the access control policy are able to decrypt the ciphertext
with their secret attribute keys. The construction is required to satisfy a collusion-
resistance property: It must be impossible for several users to pool their attribute
keys such that they are able to decrypt a ciphertext which they would not be able
to decrypt individually.
In this thesis we are concerned with several aspects of CP-ABE, mainly based on
the following papers that were published in international conferences and journals:
• Sascha Mu¨ller, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Claudia Eckert, Distributed Attribute-
Based Encryption, 11th International Conference on Information Security
and Cryptography, ICISC 2008 (Pil Joong Lee and Jung Hee Cheon, eds.),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5461, Springer, 2008, pp. 20–36;
13
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• Sascha Mu¨ller, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Claudia Eckert, On Multi-Authority
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, Bulletin of the Korean Mathe-
matical Society (B-KMS) 46 (2009), no. 4, 803–819;
• Sascha Mu¨ller and Stefan Katzenbeisser, Hiding the Policy in Cryptographic
Access Control, 7th International Workshop on Security and Trust Manage-
ment (STM’11), 2011. to appear;
• Sascha Mu¨ller and Stefan Katzenbeisser, A New DRM Architecture With
Strong Enforcement, ARES, IEEE Computer Society, 2010, pp. 397-403;
as well as some minor contributions from several student theses that were developed
under the author’s supervision.
Roadmap and Contributions
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts needed
later in the thesis. These include access control, secret sharing, attribute-based
encryption and various mathematical notions.
The first major contribution of this thesis is the concept of Distributed Attribute-
Based Encryption (DABE), which is introduced and discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
In this chapter, we explain the motivation and general concept, give two crypto-
graphic constructions that implement this powerful idea and discuss their security
properties. One of these two constructions is very efficient (in fact, more effi-
cient than any other CP-ABE construction known today) but not very expressive,
while the other one is very expressive, but not as efficient. We also describe an
implementation and give performance results for it.
Chapter 4 approaches another challenge that current CP-ABE constructions face.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: The primary result is a novel CP-ABE
construction that allows to obfuscate policies such that they can be considered
anonymous in the sense of k-anonymity [CdVFS07]. To this end, we explore a new
method from graph theory that we call Syntax Tree Majors and show how to use
such trees in CP-ABE in order to achieve policy anonymity. As a secondary result,
the construction we give also shows how to extend the expressiveness of certain
CP-ABE schemes. This chapter concludes the theoretical part of the thesis.
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While a lot of different CP-ABE constructions have been published, the practical
application of such schemes to real-world scenarios is under developed in the
research community. We contribute novel research in this area in Chapter 5,
which shows how to use CP-ABE to improve Enterprise Rights Management
(ERM) scenarios. By shifting parts of the enforcement process to CP-ABE, the
personalization of player keys is made easier, while also reducing the trust into the
DRM viewer.
Our DABE concept is especially suited for very distributed settings. One
such setting are Service Oriented Architectures (SOA). Thus, we describe how to
implement core features of DABE in the form of web services in Chapter 6.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter2
Basics
2.1. Access Control
Access control, one of the most central topics in IT security, is concerned with
the question of how to restrict access to objects that are worth protecting (assets)
such that a need-to-know-principle is adhered to, i.e., no subject learns more than
he needs to. To this end, access rules are formulated for each object, usually by its
owner. These rules specify under which restrictions access to the object is to be
granted.
More formally, let O be the set of all objects of a system, and S the set of
all subjects, i.e., objects that want to actively access some of the objects. An
access rule for an object o ∈ O is a function fo : S → {0, 1} such that fo(s)
returns 1 if s ∈ S is allowed to access o ∈ O, and 0 otherwise. We call the set
Π(o) := {s ∈ S | fo(s) = 1} the set of authorized subjects of o. The union of all
subjects with access rules
⋃
o Π(o) is called the set of principals [Gol06].
Frequently, there is a further restriction describing the access operation, which,
for example, could be a read access or a write access. In this work, we are only
concerned with read accesses.
The primary focus of this thesis is the enforcement of access rules. Usually, there
is a trusted party that has full control over the assets, called the reference monitor
[GGKL89]. It enforces rules that it receives from the owners of the objects. The
reference monitor gets active on every access attempt, determines if the accessing
subject has the right to access the object (i.e., fo(s)
?
= 1), and if so, allows the
17
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access. The high demands imposed on such a party, especially trustworthiness,
full control over all objects, and good performance even with many object access
requests, motivate the question to construct other ways to enforce access rules.
One promising attempt is information-centric security, which binds security
directly to data and the people who access it [RSA11]: Instead of having a trusted
party in the form of a gateway controlling all accesses, the information essentially
protects itself. Note that throughout this work we will use the term data-centric
security instead, as it appears to be more fitting from a technical point of view.
Cryptographically enforced access control A simple approach to obtain data-
centric security is to use encryption: We can encrypt each object o with an
encryption key Eo and give the corresponding decryption key Do to all authorized
subjects, i.e., elements of Π(o). Thus, the authorized subjects of o can access it (by
decrypting it), while all other subjects can not. In such an approach, everybody
who releases an object has full control over who is able to access it since he controls
the distribution of Do. Furthermore, there needs to be no trusted party to enforce
access rules. They are essentially self-enforcing. Basically, the effect of such an
architecture is that instead of protecting the assets, it is the keys Do that need
protection. This also moves the computational cost of access control from the
trusted party to the decrypting parties.
However, it is obvious that this approach does not scale very well. The owners
of the objects need to create many encryption/decryption key pairs, and the more
open and distributed a setting is, the harder it gets to distribute the keys to all
allowed subjects. Attribute-Based Encryption attempts to solve these challenges.
2.2. Attribute-Based Encryption
In Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), ciphertexts and/or user keys are associated
with policies that describe who is allowed to access the encrypted information.
Specifically, in Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) ciphertexts are
encrypted with a set of attributes and each user’s secret key is associated with a
policy describing which ciphertexts he can decrypt (see Figure 2.1). Such a policy
is a predicate over the set of attributes, usually formulated as a Boolean formula.
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Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext
Key policySet of keys
Figure 2.1: Schematic overview of KP-ABE
Conversely, in Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) a ci-
phertext is encrypted with a policy. Anyone whose attributes satisfy the policy
can decrypt the ciphertext; otherwise the decryption fails (see Figure 2.2). In a
nutshell, in CP-ABE a policy is applied during encryption and in KP-ABE a policy
is applied during decryption.
An attribute is a property or feature that a subject may have. At some point in
time, any subject may become eligible for a particular attribute, meaning that it
now has the respective property or feature. It then receives a token from a trusted
party called attribute authority that testifies his eligibility and can be used by
him to prove that he has the property or feature that the corresponding attribute
represents.
An attribute is usually represented as a string. For example, an attribute called
isAdmin could be used to describe subjects that are administrators of a certain
domain. We denote the set of all attributes used in a specific domain as the
universe of attributes. In CP-ABE, policies over the universe of attributes are
formulated for each object to describe what prerequisites a subject must have to
access it.
The idea of using policies for encryption was first proposed as a primitive
called Policy-Based Cryptography by Bagga and Molva [BM05, BMC06], in which
– similarly to Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption – policies where used
as encryption/decryption keys. However, their schemes have a crucial drawback:
19
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Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext
Ciphertext policy Set of keys
Figure 2.2: Schematic overview of CP-ABE
They are not secure against collusions, i.e., users with different sets of attributes
are able to combine their sets to collaboratively decrypt ciphertexts that were
encrypted with policies they would not be able to satisfy individually. We note
that later the authors managed to circumvent this problem by also encrypting the
ciphertexts with the public key of a receiver [BM06]. This, however, neglects the
most important property of this approach, namely to encrypt data with a policy
instead of a user or group key.
The notion of Attribute-Based Encryption was first introduced in 2005 by
Sahai and Waters [SW05] as an application of their idea of Fuzzy Identity-Based
Encryption. Here, each user key is associated with a set of attributes ω, and
each ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes ω′. A decryption is possible,
whenever a user’s ω overlaps a ciphertext’s ω′ in at least d attributes, where d is a
fixed value decided on during system setup, i.e., |ω ∩ ω′| ≥ d.
In the following year, Goyal et al. [GPSW06] proposed the first expressive KP-
ABE scheme (that allowed key policies in the form of logical formulas instead of
simple thresholds), which was followed by the first CP-ABE scheme by Bethencourt
et al. [BSW07] in the next year. Bethencourt’s construction could only be proved
secure in the Generic Group Model, and it has since become apparent that CP-
ABE constructions with reduction proofs are hard to construct. In 2007 Cheung
and Newport [CN07] gave a CP-ABE construction with a reduction proof, but
it was restricted to policies in DNF notation. Since then, numerous CP-ABE
20
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schemes have been proposed with varying features that support different types
of policy languages [Cha07, CN07, LCLS08, GJPS08, AI09, BKP09, LCLX09,
NYO09, LOS+10, LW11, ZH10, YWRL10b].
We will now describe the CP-ABE scheme as a 4-tuple of probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) algorithms as originally proposed in [BSW07]1:
(PK ,MK )← Setup(1k). The setup algorithm takes no input other than the
security parameter 1k. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master
key MK .
CT ← Encrypt(PK ,M,A). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK , a message M , and an access structure A over the universe
of attributes. The algorithm will encrypt M and produce a ciphertext CT
such that only a user who possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the
access structure will be able to decrypt the message. We will assume that
the policy A is usually sent along with the ciphertext CT , as it is needed for
decryption.
SK L ← KeyGen(MK , L). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master
key MK and a set of attributes L that describe the key. It outputs a private
key SK L that contains a set of keys corresponding to the attributes of L.
{M, NULL} ← Decrypt(PK ,CT , SK L). The decryption algorithm takes as input
the public parameters PK, a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy
A, and a private key SK L that is a private key for a set L of attributes. If
the set L of attributes satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm
will decrypt the ciphertext and return a message M ; otherwise the algorithm
returns NULL.
CP-ABE allows to enforce access rules in many practical scenarios. For example,
in the popular Role-based Access Control (RBAC) approach, users are assigned to
roles and each user’s roles determine which rights he has. CP-ABE can be used
to efficiently enforce access rights in an RBAC scenario: For each role there is an
attribute, and for each role a user possesses, he receives the corresponding attribute.
1We omit the description of the additional algorithm Delegate in [BSW07] as it will not be
needed in the rest of this thesis and is not implemented in most CP-ABE constructions.
21
2. Basics
(user.adult (= true) OR
creditcard = verified)
AND (
(contprov1.article1234.status = purchased AND
contprov1.account = balanced)
OR
(contprov2.article1234.status = purchased AND
contprov2.account = balanced)
)
Figure 2.3: An example policy
Access rights are described as logical formulas over the universe of attributes. For
example, if data is encrypted with a policy RoleA AND (RoleB OR RoleC), every
user who is active in the role RoleA and also in either RoleB or RoleC (or both)
can decrypt the data.
As another example, consider a company that hosts DRM protected media files.
Users can purchase licenses from various content providers that issue usage licenses
containing keys required to decrypt the protected files. Let us assume that two
such content providers are contprov1 and contprov2. A usage license could be
expressed as a Boolean formula over attributes. For example, the policy could state
that the protected file should only be decrypted by someone who has purchased
licenses from at least one of the given content providers and is authenticated as an
adult (see Figure 2.3). Here, we use the fact that a subject may become eligible
of an attribute at some point in time, i.e., he has to purchase the file before he
gets eligible of the attribute contprov1.article1234.status = purchased. It
is also possible to automatically extract such policies from policies in Open Digital
Rights Language (ODRL), as we will show in Chapter 5.
Note that in both examples, rules are enforced automatically by the cryptographic
construction, and no trusted entity is required to manually enforce the policies on
every access. Also, the access rules may be very complex allowing for elaborate,
fine-grained access control if desired by the scenario.
Many variations of CP-ABE are thinkable. For, example, note that the key SK L
that is received via KeyGen contains a set of private keys corresponding to the
attributes L that the user is eligible for, and the KeyGen algorithm is executed
once to claim the full set of these private keys for a user. In the open, distributed
scenario that we consider interesting for CP-ABE applications, this is not desirable,
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as the number of possible attributes is very large, and users may later become
eligible of attributes that they were not eligible for before (as seen in the DRM
example).
To meet these challenges, we introduce Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption,
where an arbitrary number of Attribute Authorities manage and issue keys, and
users can query for keys at any time. In a way, CP-ABE can be seen as a special
case of DABE with only a single authority.
Similarly, in other scenarios, Broadcast Encryption (BE) is used to restrict access
to media by cryptographic means (see for example [FN93]). In BE, a media is
encrypted in a way that only certain subsets of users can decrypt. In contrast to
ABE, BE schemes are typically designed to later revoke users that for some reason
lose their right to access an object. Clearly, there are some connections between BE
and ABE and combinations of the two seem promising. For example, BE has been
used to add a revocation mechanism to ABE schemes [AI09]. Another example is
Attribute-Based Broadcast Encryption [JK10, ZH10], in which the eligible subsets
of users may be refined by attributes. However, all participants must be known by
their identity when the system is set up, whereas in ABE, user identities can only
be modeled indirectly through attributes (for the purpose of formulating access
rules).
2.3. Mathematical Foundations
2.3.1. Pairing-Based Cryptography
Throughout this work we will use cryptographic pairings as building blocks upon
which we build our constructions. Generalizing the pairing definition from [Bon07],
we define:
Definition 2.1 (Pairings). Let G1,G2,GT be cyclic groups of order p. A function
e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a pairing if
1. the group operations in G1,G2 and GT can be computed efficiently;
2. the function e is bilinear, i.e., for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp it holds
that:
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab ;
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3. e can be computed efficiently;
4. e is non-degenerate, i.e., there are g1 ∈ G and g2 ∈ G2, such that e(g1, g2) 6=
1.
There are three types of pairings [GPS08]: If G1 = G2, then the pairing is called
symmetric. Asymmetric pairings, where G1 6= G2, can be classified further into
ones where there is an efficiently computable homomorphism φ : G1 → G2 and
ones which have no such homomorphism. In this thesis, we will not use pairings of
the latter type.
For symmetric pairings, we will usually write all elements of G := G1 = G2
and GT in the form A = ga or A = gaT , where g ∈ G is a generator of G and
gT := e(g, g) ∈ GT is a generator of GT . We assume that for all groups the
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH) holds, i.e., given (g, ga, gb) it is
hard to compute gab and given (gT , g
a
T , g
b
T ) it is hard to compute g
ab
T . Note that
due to the properties of pairings, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH)
does not hold in G, i.e., given (g, ga, gb, gc) it is easy to determine if c ?= ab by
comparing e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab with e(g, gc) = e(g, g)c. There is, however, a variant
of the DDH which is considered hard in pairing groups, and often used for security
reductions. The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (d-(BDH)) problem is defined
as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem). For a symmetric
pairing e : G×G → GT with generator g ∈ G, given ga, gb, gc ∈ G and Z ∈ GT ,
decide if Z = e(g, g)abc.
An algorithm B that outputs a bit {0, 1} has advantage  in solving d-(BDH) in
G if
∣∣Pr [B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z = e(g, g)abc) = 0]− Pr [B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z 6= e(g, g)abc) = 0]∣∣ ≥  ,
where the randomness is over the random bits consumed by B.
We say that the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if no PPT
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional BDH problem.
In cryptography, pairings were first used by Alfred Menezes et al. [MOV93] to
attack elliptic curve cryptosystems. Later, Joux [Jou00] showed that pairings can
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be utilized to implement a one-round Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol for
three parties using a pairing. We briefly describe a variant of this protocol using
a symmetric pairing: Let G := G1 = G2 be groups of order p and let g ∈ G a
generator of G. Each of the three parties chooses a random number, i.e., a, b, c ∈ Zp.
Each party then raises g to the power of its secret number, i.e., A := ga, B := gb,
and C := gc and publishes that value. Now each of the parties can compute the
same secret key using its secret number and the published values from the other
parties, because e(A,B)c = e(A,C)b = e(B,C)a = e(g, g)abc. This key is a shared
secret of the three parties. The task of an attacker is to recover this shared secret
using only the public keys A, B, and C, but neither a, b, or c. It is easy to see
that this protocol is secure under the d-(BDH) assumption.
However, the birth of pairing-based cryptography has to be primarily attributed
to Dan Boneh and Matt Franklin [BF03], who used pairings to solve a problem
that had been open for over 15 years, namely that of Identity Based Encryption,
thus opening a completely new field of cryptographic research.
2.3.2. Implementations
In this thesis we are not concerned with the implementation and inner workings of
pairings, but we will use them in the form of black boxes. However, we need to
understand the implications and demands of existing implementations of pairings:
Computing pairings is quite expensive. The fastest known pairing to date is the
ηT pairing (including some variants of it, like the R-ate pairing), which in its
fastest known implementation requires about 2-3 million clock cycles on modern
CPUs [BGDM+10]. There also exist fast hardware implementations [BDF+10]
and pairings have even been used in smartcards [SCA06] and RFIDs [IOIO07].
The arguably most mature software implementation of pairings is the PBC library
[Lyn] that was developed by Ben Lynn during his PhD thesis [Lyn07] and has
since been ported to many languages besides the original C implementation, e.g.,
C++, Java, Python, and Perl. Whenever we implement cryptographic algorithms,
we will use this library.
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2.4. CP-ABE Proofs
When building CP-ABE constructions we are primarily interested in their security
against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA). As noted in – for example – [CN07],
CPA secure CP-ABE schemes can be extended to CCA secure schemes by sending
a one-time signature along with each encryption using an approach that is similar
to [BCHK07]. Recently, Yamada et al. [YAHK11] examined this idea more closely
and found that such an extension works for all well-known CP-ABE schemes.
We will not go into details regarding this process, and neither do we claim CCA
security of our proposed constructions. We will, however, prove CPA security. In
this section, we briefly review security definitions specific to CP-ABE constructions,
and most importantly introduce the proof framework that we will use throughout
this thesis.
2.4.1. CPA Security Game
The CPA-Security game for CP-ABE is defined as follows
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
lists of attributes L. Each time, the challenger answers with a secret key
SK L for L.
Challenge. The adversary submits two messages M0 and M1 of equal length as well
as the challenge access structure A, with the restriction that none of the keys
he received in Phase 1 satisfies A. The challenger chooses b R←− {0, 1} and
encrypts Mb with A. The resulting ciphertext CT is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1. However, the adversary can only query for keys that
do not satisfy A.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
An algorithm B that outputs a bit {0, 1} has advantage  in solving the game if
|Pr [B(b′ = b) = 0]− Pr [B(b′ 6= b) = 0]| ≥  ,
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where the randomness is over the random bits consumed by B.
It is noteworthy that nearly all CP-ABE constructions are only proven secure
in a selective version of this game, which has an additional Init phase and more
restrictive requirements:
Init. The adversary chooses the challenge access structure A.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
lists of attributes L. Each time, the challenger answers with a secret key
SK L for L. However, the adversary can only query for keys that do not
satisfy A.
Challenge. The adversary submits two messages M0 and M1 of equal length. The
challenger chooses b
R←− {0, 1} and encrypts Mb with A. The resulting
ciphertext CT is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
However, in all proofs that will be given in the context of this thesis, we use the
stronger, non-selective game without the Init phase.
2.4.2. The General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem
To prove the security of cryptographic constructions, it is common to use security
reductions to simple mathematical assumptions. To do this, a simulator maps the
elements (i.e., the input and output variables) of the construction to the elements
of the assumption, showing that breaking the construction implies breaking the
assumption. In CP-ABE this approach turns out to be very difficult, because —
as Waters noted in [Wat11] — the elements of CP-ABE include complex access
policies that cannot easily be mapped to the short, fixed number of parameters
of simple assumptions like the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (see
Definition 2.2).
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This problem led to the introduction of several new and often rather complex
assumptions that were often tailored to specific crytographic ABE constructions.
The elements of these new assumptions mirror the structure of the elements used
in the respective CP-ABE constructions. To provide evidence that these new
assumptions were correct, the Generic Group Model [Sho97] was used frequently.
This helped to demonstrate the hardness of the invented problem. More recently,
some constructions were published that use the Generic Group Model directly to
show their security. Note that the provability of a protocol in the Generic Group
Model does not imply that there is also a security reduction to any standard
assumption possible for that protocol, as shown in [Pas11].
We will now give a brief introduction to the Generic Group Model developed in
[BB08] as it is used in pairing-based cryptography, which we simplify slightly for
the symmetric case where G1 = G2 =: G.
In the generic group model, the adversary is given only encoded versions of all
group elements, that look like random strings. For groups G and GT of prime
order p and a generator g˜ ∈ G we use random maps ξ, ξT : Zp → {0, 1}m for
sufficiently large m to encode any element g˜x or e(g˜, g˜)x as a random string ξ(x) or
ξT (x). The maps ξ and ξT must be invertible, so that the representations of group
elements can be transformed back to elements of G and GT . To manipulate these
encoded group elements, the attacker gets access to five oracles, which compute
multiplication and division operations in G and GT and the pairing operation
e. All oracles take as input string representations of group elements. Given two
string representations ξ(a) and ξ(b) of elements g˜a, g˜b ∈ G, the adversary can query
two different oracles (the multiplication and the division oracle) for the result of
the group operations g˜a · g˜b and g˜a · g˜−b. Both oracles will map the coded inputs
ξ(a) and ξ(b) back to the respective elements of G using ξ−1, execute the group
operation and map the result to a string using ξ. From the view of the adversary,
the multiplication oracle returns ξ(a+ b), while the division oracle returns ξ(a− b).
The oracles for computing multiplications and divisions in GT operate analogously,
by using the encoding ξT instead of ξ. Note that no oracle will accept input from
different encodings (for example, one cannot feed a value ξT (b) into an oracle for a
group operation of G). The pairing oracle can be implemented easily: Given two
encodings ξ(a) and ξ(b), the encoding of the pairing is given by ξT (a · b). A scheme
proven secure in this model is called generically secure and can only be broken by
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exploiting specific algebraic properties of the groups used in an implementation.
Due to the random choice of ξ and ξT , two polynomials that evaluate to different
values over Zp yield different encodings when mapped by ξ and ξT , except if
1. for a vector (x1, . . . , xn) and some polynomials pi, pj that can be constructed
using the oracles it holds that (pi−pj)(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 although (pi−pj) 6= 0,
or
2. due to the choice of the random encodings two different values “accidentally”
are mapped to the same string. This can be circumvented by programming
the oracles such that they are injective, i.e., x 6= y ⇒ ξ(x) 6= ξ(y).
By these preliminaries a construction can be proven secure as follows: If it can
be shown that the probability of the first incident occurring is negligible, then an
attacker can only compute the terms that he gains by combining the terms that he
knows by using the group oracles. If he cannot compute a term that would allow
him to win the security game in question, he cannot win it at all.
The General Diffie-Hellman-Exponent assumption as introduced in Appendix
A.2 of [BBG05] is a framework that formalizes these ideas and thus allows to show
the security of a construction by observing the terms given to the adversary. It
is crucial to all our security proofs, so we repeat the important definitions and
theorems here.
First we need to capture the properties of the group oracles by the following
definition:
Definition 2.3 (Dependent Polynomials). Let Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]s be two s-
tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp. Write Pˆ = (p1, p2, . . . , ps) and Qˆ =
(q1, q2, . . . , qs), where p1 = q1 = 1. We say that a polynomial f ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn] is
dependent on the sets (Pˆ , Qˆ) if there exist s2 + s constants {ai,j}si,j=1, {bk}sk=1 such
that
f =
s∑
i,j=1
ai,jpipj +
s∑
k=1
bkqk .
We say that f is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ) if f is not dependent on (Pˆ , Qˆ).
This definition describes how an adversary can combine the terms that he knows
by calling the group oracles for multiplication, division and the pairing operation.
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In our proofs, Pˆ and Qˆ are all polynomials that are given to the attacker, and
f is a polynomial of GT that he has to construct to break the security of the
respective construction. His task is to distinguish between ξT (f(x1, . . . , xn)) and a
random value. If he succeeds then, under the Generic Group Assumption, he can
distinguish between g
f(x1,...,xn)
T and a random value of GT . Formally:
Definition 2.4 (Decision (Pˆ , Qˆ, f)-Diffie-Hellman Problem). Let
Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp. Given a
generator g ∈ G, gT = e(g, g) and the vector
H(x1, . . . , xn) =
(
gPˆ (x1,...,xn), g
Qˆ(x1,...,xn)
T
)
∈ Gs ×GsT
distinguish g
f(x1,...,xn)
T (with f ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]) from a random value T ∈ GT .
We say that an algorithm B that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has advantage  in solving
the Decision (Pˆ , Qˆ, f)-Diffie-Hellman Problem in G if
∣∣Pr [B(H(x1, . . . , xn), gf(x1,...,xn)) = 0]− Pr [B(H(x1, . . . , xn), T ) = 0]∣∣ >  ,
where the probability is over the random choice of the generator g ∈ G, the random
choice of x1, . . . , xn in Fp, the random choice of T ∈ GT , and the random bits
consumed by B.
In [BBG05], the following theorem is shown which shows that the adversary
advantage is negligible if f is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ):
Theorem 2.1 ([BBG05]). For a generic bilinear group of order p with oracles
ξ, ξT let Pˆ , Qˆ, and f defined as above and let d = max(2 deg(Pˆ ), deg(Qˆ), deg(f)).
If f is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ), then for any adversary A that makes a total of at
most q queries to the oracles computing the group operations in G, GT and the
pairing e : G×G→ GT we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
A

p, ξ(Pˆ (x1, . . . , xn)),
ξT (Qˆ(x1, . . . , xn)),
ξT (t0), ξT (t1)
 = b :
x1, . . . , xn, y
R←− Fp,
b
R←− {0, 1},
tb ←− f(x1, . . . , xn),
t1−b ←− y
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q + 2s+ 2)
2 · d
2p
Proof. See Theorem A.2 in [BBG05].
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Corollary 2.1 ([BBG05]). Let Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate
polynomials over Fp and let F ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]. Let d = max(2 deg(Pˆ ), deg(Qˆ), deg(f)).
If f is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ), then any A that has advantage 1/2 in solving the
decision (Pˆ , Qˆ, f)-Diffie-Hellman-Problem in a generic bilinear group G must take
time at least Ω(
√
p/d− s).
In Chapter 4 we will also use the asymmetric case:
Definition 2.5 (Dependant Polynomials, Asymmetric case). Let P,Q,R be three
s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp, i.e., P,Q,R ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]s. Write
P = (p1, p2, . . . , ps), Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qs) and R = (r1, r2, . . . , rs) where p1 = q1 =
r1 = 1. We say that a polynomial f ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn] is dependent on the sets
(P,Q,R) if there exist 2s2 + s constants {ai,j}si,j=1, {bi,j}si,j=1, {ck}sk=1 such that
f =
s∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
ai,jpiqj +
s∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
bi,jqiqj +
s∑
k=1
ckrk
We say that f is independent of (P,Q,R) if f is not dependent on (P,Q,R).
Boneh et al. prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 ([BBG05]). Let P,Q,R ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]s be three s-tuples of n-
variate polynomials over Fp and let f ∈ Fp[x1, . . . , xn]. Let d = max(deg(P ) +
deg(Q), 2 deg(Q), deg(R), deg(f)). If f is independent of (P,Q,R) then any A
that has advantage 1/2 in solving the decision (P,Q,R, f)-Diffie-Hellman Problem
in a generic bilinear group (G1,G2) must take time at least Ω(
√
p/d− s).
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Chapter3
Distributed Attribute-Based
Encryption
In this chapter we formalize the concept of Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption,
give a security model and describe two possible constructions. The first construction
will be shown to be very efficient, surpassing all other known CP-ABE constructions
in terms of efficiency.
3.1. Motivation
Common to most previous CP-ABE schemes is the existence of a central trusted
authority (master) that knows a secret master key and distributes secret attribute
keys to eligible users. However, for many attribute-based scenarios, it is much
more natural to support multiple authorities [Cha07, SW05]. The limitation to a
single central authority for attribute generation is neither realistic nor desirable
in applications where no single entity has the authority to grant secret keys for
arbitrary attributes.
We can, for exemplary purposes, illustrate one such scenario as follows. Consider
a company that hosts DRM protected media files. Users can purchase licenses
from various content providers that issue usage licenses that contain the keys
required to decrypt the protected files. Let us assume that three such content
providers are contprov1.com, contprov2.com, and contprov3.com. The usage
license (see Figure 3.1) can be expressed as a Boolean formula over attributes.
35
3. Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption
http://db.mycompany.org : isAdmin OR
http://db.mycompany.org : hasFullAccess OR
( http://www.openid.org : is18OrOlder AND
( http://www.contprov1.com : article1234.hasPaidFor OR
http://www.contprov2.com : article4325.hasPaidFor OR
http://www.contprov3.com : articleABC.hasPurchased ) )
Figure 3.1: An example policy
Here, attributes consist of an URL that specifies a party who has authority over
an attribute and an identifier describing the attribute itself, both represented as
strings and concatenated with a single colon character as separator. Note that we
consider the URL part of the attribute name.
The intuition behind this sample policy is that the protected file should only be
decrypted by someone who either is an administrator of the company database
db.mycompany.org, has the rights to download all files, or is at least 18 years
old (which is established by an identification service www.openid.org) and has
purchased licenses from at least one of the given content providers. Note that the
same media file might be identified by different product codes in different providers’
databases.
It is difficult to use this policy in a standard CP-ABE scheme, since there
is no central authority who maintains and controls all attributes; in the above
example, www.contprov1.com is solely responsible for maintaining the attribute ar-
ticle1234.hasPaidFor, while db.mycompany.org has authority over the attribute
isAdmin. While it is possible that a third party is set up to which the maintenance
of all attributes is delegated, this solution obviously does not scale. In addition,
this solution is problematic if the entities mutually distrust each other.
Outline The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2
describes the intuition behind DABE, which is then described more formally in
Section 3.3. In the final Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we describe two DABE constructions,
including proofs and evaluations. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
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3.2. DABE Intuition
We propose Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption (DABE) to mitigate this
problem. DABE allows an arbitrary number of authorities to independently
maintain attributes. There are three different types of entites in a DABE scheme:
a master, attribute authorities and users.
A central trusted authority is responsible for the distribution of secret user keys.
However, in contrast to standard CP-ABE schemes, this party is not involved in the
creation of secret attribute keys; the latter task can independently be performed
by the attribute authorities.
Attribute authorities are responsible to verify whether a user is eligible of a
specific attribute; in this case they distribute a secret attribute key to the user.
(Note that determining the users’ eligibility is application dependent and thus
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we will discuss this process later in
Chapter 6.) In our scheme every attribute is associated with a single attribute
authority, but each attribute authority can be responsible for an arbitrary number
of attributes. Every attribute authority has full control over the structure and
semantics of its attributes. An attribute authority generates a public attribute key
for each attribute it maintains; this public key is available to every user. Eligible
users receive a personalized secret attribute key over an authenticated and trusted
channel. This secret key, which is personalized to prevent collusion attacks, is
required to decrypt a ciphertext.
Users can encrypt and decrypt messages. To encrypt a message, a user first
formulates his access policy in the form of a Boolean formula over some attributes.
The party finally uses the public keys corresponding to the attributes occurring in
the policy to encrypt. In DNF, all negations are atomic, so attribute authorities
should be able to issue negative attributes as well in order to make use of the full
expressive power of DNF formulas, i.e., there should be attributes attesting that a
user does not have a specific property.
To decrypt a ciphertext, a user needs at least access to some set of attributes
(and their associated secret keys) which satisfies the access policy. If he does not
already possess these keys, he may query the attribute authorities for the secret
keys corresponding to the attributes he is eligible of. Figure 3.2 visualizes the
interaction between the participants.
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Trusted Authority
Decryptors
Attribute Authorities
Encryptors
Figure 3.2: Parties involved in DABE
To illustrate the use of a DABE scheme, we return to the above mentioned
example of the protection of media files. Figure 3.3 shows the policy of Figure 3.1
in DNF. The policy consists of five conjunctions over different sets of attributes.
A user needs all secret attribute keys of at least one of the conjunctive terms to be
able to decrypt a ciphertext that was encrypted with this access policy.
A user who downloads the ciphertext analyzes the policy and tests if he has a
sufficient set of attributes to decrypt. The user may contact attribute authorities
for secret attribute keys he does not already have in his possession but he is
eligible of. For instance, he may query www.openid.org for a secret attribute
key corresponding to is18OrOlder and contprov3.com for a secret attribute key
corresponding to the attribute articleABC.hasPurchased. In this case he is able
to satisfy the last conjunction. It may be necessary for him to perform additional
steps if he is not yet eligible for an attribute. For example, he might decide to buy
the article articleABC from contprov3.com to get the respective attribute.
Note that every attribute authority independently decides on the structure and
semantics of its attributes. For instance, the authority db.mycompany.org offers
the attribute isAdmin. The meaning of this attribute and the semantics (i.e.,
the decision who is eligible of it) is entirely up to db.mycompany.org. Whoever
includes the attribute in an access policy needs to trust the respective authority to
correctly determine eligibility.
Note that a DABE scheme must be collusion-resistant: if a user u has a friend v
who possesses an attribute that u does not have, it should not be possible for u to
use the corresponding secret attribute key of v. Neither should u be able to give
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http://db.mycompany.org : isAdmin
OR
http://db.mycompany.org : hasFullAccess
OR
( http://www.openid.org : is18OrOlder AND
http://www.contprov1.com : article1234.hasPaidFor )
OR
( http://www.openid.org : is18OrOlder AND
http://www.contprov2.com : article4325.hasPaidFor)
OR
( http://www.openid.org : is18OrOlder AND
http://www.contprov3.com : articleABC.hasPurchased )
Figure 3.3: Policy of Figure 3.1 in DNF
any of his attribute keys to v in a form that allows v to use them together with
its own keys. All secret attribute keys are bound to their owner, making them
unusable with keys issued for other users.
3.3. Formal Description
3.3.1. DABE Algorithms
A DABE scheme consists of seven algorithms: Setup, CreateUser, CreateAuthority,
RequestAttributePK, RequestAttributeSK, Encrypt and Decrypt. The description
of these algorithms is as follows:
(PK ,MK )← Setup(1k) The Setup algorithm takes as input the security param-
eter 1k. This parameter is often implicitly determined by the application
and implementation. Setup outputs the public key PK which is used in all
subsequent algorithms, and the secret master key MK .
(PK u, SK u)← CreateUser(PK ,MK , u) The CreateUser algorithm takes as input
the public key PK , the master key MK , and a user name u. It outputs
a public user key PK u that will be used by attribute authorities to issue
secret attribute keys for u, and a secret user key SK u, that will be used in
conjunction with secret attribute keys to decrypt ciphertexts. The user must
later be able to prove the connection between his public user key PK u and
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his identity, for example by the use of a PKI. We will elaborate on this in
Chapter 6, where we describe an implementation of a DABE scheme for a
practical scenario.
SK a ← CreateAuthority(PK , a) The CreateAuthority algorithm is executed by
the attribute authority with identifier a once during initialization. It outputs
a secret authority key SK a.
{PKA, NULL} ← RequestAttributePK(PK ,A, SK a) The RequestAttributePK al-
gorithm is executed by attribute authorities whenever they receive a request
for a public attribute key corresponding to an attribute A. The algorithm
checks whether the authority is responsible for the attribute A. If this is the
case, the algorithm outputs a public attribute key PKA, otherwise NULL.
{SKA,u, NULL} ← RequestAttributeSK(PK ,A, SK a, u,PK u) The RequestAttri-
buteSK algorithm is executed by the attribute authority with identifier a
whenever it receives a request for a secret attribute key. The algorithm
checks whether it has authority over attribute A and whether the user u
with public key PK u is eligible of A. If this is the case, RequestAttributeSK
outputs a secret attribute key SKA,u for user u. Otherwise, the algorithm
outputs NULL.
CT ← Encrypt(PK ,M,A,PKA1 , . . . ,PKAN ) The Encrypt algorithm takes as in-
put the public key PK , a message M , an access policy A and the public keys
PKA1 , . . . ,PKAN corresponding to all attributes occurring in the policy A.
The algorithm encrypts M with A and outputs the ciphertext CT .
{M, NULL} ← Decrypt(PK ,CT ,A, SK u, SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u) The Decrypt algo-
rithm gets as input a ciphertext CT produced by the Encrypt algorithm,
an access policy A under which CT was encrypted, and a key ring SK u,
SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u for user u, which includes the secret user key SK u and
secret attribute keys SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u for attributes A1, . . . ,AN . The al-
gorithm Decrypt decrypts the ciphertext CT and outputs the corresponding
plaintext M if the attributes A1, . . . ,AN are sufficient to satisfy A; otherwise
it outputs NULL.
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Note that, as mentioned, the correct binding between u and PK u must be
ensured. A trusted certificate may be used for this purpose. Alternatively, the
attribute authority may query the trusted authority for the correct public user
key for user u. However, in this solution the central authority may become a
performance bottleneck, so a decentralized solution like a PKI is preferable.
Trusted Authority
Decryptors
Attribute Authorities
Encryptors
Setup, CreateUser
Decrypt
CreateAuthority, RequestAttributePK/-SK
Encrypt
Figure 3.4: Algorithms used in DABE
Figure 3.4 visualizes the algorithms and their relations to the involved parties.
Note that this scheme differs from CP-ABE (see Section 2.2) in that the two
algorithms CreateAuthority and RequestAttributePK were added, and the algorithm
KeyGen of CP-ABE is split into CreateUser and RequestAttributeSK. It also differs
from the construction [Cha07], where all attribute authorities are maintained by
the central authority. It is crucial that RequestAttributeSK does not need any
components of the master key MK as input, so that every attribute authority is
able to independently create attributes. However, we still require that a trusted
central party maintains users (by running CreateUser).
3.3.2. Security Model
Similarly to CP-ABE, we model the security of DABE in terms of a game between
a challenger and an adversary, where the challenger plays the role of the master and
all attribute authorities. We follow the CP-ABE security game (see Section 2.4.1),
but extend it taking into account the added features of DABE.
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Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary asks the challenger for an arbitrary number of user keys.
The challenger calls CreateUser for each requested user and returns the
resulting public and private user keys to the adversary. For each user, the
adversary can request an arbitrary number of secret and public attribute keys,
which the challenger creates by calling RequestAttributeSK or RequestAttri-
butePK, respectively. In this game, eligibility of attributes is not modeled,
and the adversary is implicitly considered eligible to all attributes during
Phase 1. In practice the adversary is weaker since he may not be eligible to
some of the attributes. During the first request for a public or private key
for an attribute of an authority a, the challenger creates the authority by a
call to CreateAuthority ; he stores the secret authority key for future use (but
does not make the key available to the attacker).
Challenge. The adversary submits two messages M0 and M1 and an access policy
A such that none of the users that he created in Phase 1 satisfies A. (If any
user from Phase 1 satisfies A, the challenger aborts.) The challenger flips a
coin b, encrypts Mb under A, and gives the ciphertext CT to the adversary.
Phase 2. Like in Phase 1, the adversary may create an arbitrary number of users.
He can also request more secret attribute keys for the users he created in
Phase 1 and 2, but if any secret attribute key would give the respective user
a set of attributes sufficient to satisfy A, the challenger aborts. As in Phase
1, the adversary is considered eligible for all other secret attribute keys and
he can always request any public attribute key.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as  = Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
, where
the probability is taken over all coin tosses of both challenger and adversary. A
DABE scheme is called secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in the above game, i.e., if , viewed as a function of the
security parameter k used for initialization of the scheme, satisfies (k) < 1/p(k)
for all polynomials p(·) and sufficiently large k ∈ N.
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3.4. Construction
3.4.1. Description
We next give a first and very efficient construction of a DABE scheme, which
is based on bilinear groups and requires access policies in the form of Boolean
formulas written in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF); the algorithms introduced in
Section 3.3.1 are implemented as follows:
Setup(1k) The Setup algorithm chooses a symmetric pairing e : G × G → GT
of order p (see Section 2.3.1). Next it chooses a generator g ∈ G, and two
random group elements P,Q ∈ G. The public key of the system is PK =
{G,GT , e, g, P, e(g,Q)}, while the secret master key is given by MK = Q.
Note that our construction can easily be modified to work with asymmetric
pairings e : G1 × G2 → GT , which can be more efficient for high security
settings [GPS08]. In this case, g is a generator of G1 and one chooses the
random elements P,Q ∈ G2.
CreateUser(PK ,MK , u) The algorithm CreateUser chooses a secret mku ∈ Zp
and outputs the public key PK u := g
mku and the private key SK u :=
MK · Pmku = Q · Pmku for user u.
CreateAuthority(PK , a) The algorithm CreateAuthority chooses uniformly and
randomly a hash function Hxa : {0, 1}∗ → Zp from a large finite family of
hash functions, which we model as random oracles. It returns as secret key
the index of the hash function SK a := xa.
RequestAttributePK(PK ,A, SK a) If A is handled by the attribute authority a,
RequestAttributePK returns the public attribute key of A, which consists
of two parts: PKA :=
〈
PK ′A := g
HSKa (A),PK ′′A := e(g,Q)
HSKa (A)
〉
, otherwise
the algorithm returns NULL. The public key can be requested from the
attribute authority by anyone, but RequestAttributePK can only be executed
by the authority responsible for A, as it requires the secret index of the hash
function SK a as input.
RequestAttributeSK(PK ,A, SK a, u,PK u) After determining that the attribute
A is handled by a, the authority tests whether user u is eligible for the
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attribute A. (The implementation of this operation is application-dependent
and thus outside the scope of this work.) If this is not the case, Request-
AttributeSK returns NULL, else it outputs the secret attribute key SKA,u :=
PK u
HSKa (A) = gmkuHSKa (A). Note that the recipient u can check the validity
of this secret key by testing if e(PK ′A, SK u) = PK
′′
A · e(SKA,u, P ).
Encrypt(PK ,M,A,PKA1 , . . . ,PKAN ) A policy in DNF can be written as
A =
k∨
j=1
 ∧
A∈Sj
A
 ,
where N sets S1, . . . , Sk denote attributes that occur in the j-th conjunction
of A. The encryption algorithm iterates over all j = 1, . . . , k, generates for
each conjunction a random value Rj ∈ Zp and constructs a tuple CT j =〈
Ej, E
′
j, E
′′
j
〉
, where
Ej := M · (
∏
A∈Sj
PK ′′A)
Rj , E ′j := P
Rj , and E ′′j := (
∏
A∈Sj
PK ′A)
Rj . (3.1)
The ciphertext CT is obtained as tuple CT := 〈CT 1, . . . ,CT k〉.
Decrypt(PK ,CT ,A, SK u, SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u) To decrypt a ciphertext CT , De-
crypt first checks whether any conjunction of A can be satisfied by the given
attributes, i.e., whether the input SKA1,u, . . . , SKAk,u contains at least secret
keys for all attributes occurring in a set Sj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k. If this is not
the case, the algorithm outputs NULL, otherwise
M = Ej ·
e(
∏
i∈Sj
SK i,u, E
′
j)
e(E ′′j , SK u)
.
Correctness. Let aj :=
∑
A∈Sj HSKaA (A), where we denote by aA the attribute
authority of A. Then
Ej = M · e(g,Q)ajRj , E ′′j = gajRj (3.2)
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and
Ej ·
e(
∏
i∈Sj
SK i,u, E
′
j)
e(E ′′j , SK u)
= M · e(g,Q)ajRj · e(g
mkuaj , PRj)
e(gajRj , Q · Pmku)
= M · e(g,Q)ajRj · e(g, P )
Rjmkuaj
e(g,Q)ajRj · e(g, P )Rjmkuaj
= M.
The same is true for the asymmetric case, as SKi,u = g
mkuHSKa (A) ∈ G1, E ′j =
PRj ∈ G2, E ′′j is product of some PK ′A = gHSKa (A) ∈ G1, and SK u = Q·Pmku ∈ G2.
3.4.2. CPA-Security
To prove the security of our construction, we basically follow the structure of
the security proof of the CP-ABE scheme introduced in [BSW07]. First we show
how any adversary who plays the DABE game of Section 3.3.2 (denoted Adv1 in
the following) can be used to construct an adversary in a slightly modified game
(denoted Adv2). Then we prove that no such Adv2 can exist. Thus, no Adv1 can
exist, either. We define the modified game that is used by Adv2 in the following
manner: The phases Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 are equal to the DABE game.
In the Challenge phase, the adversary submits an access policy A such that none
of the users that he created in Phase 1 satisfies A. The challenger flips a coin b,
and creates a ciphertext for the access policy A according to Eq. (3.1), but instead
of computing Ej as in Eq. (3.2), he computes Ej as
Ej =
e(g,Q)ajRj , if b = 1e(g, g)θj , if b = 0,
where all θj are uniformly and independently chosen random elements of Zp. The
task of Adv2 is thus to distinguish the two group elements e(g,Q)
ajRj and e(g, g)θj
of GT .
Lemma 3.1. If there exists an adversary Adv1 who has advantage of  to win the
original game, then there exists an adversary Adv2 which wins the modified game
with advantage /2.
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Proof. Given an adversary Adv1 that has advantage  in the DABE game, we can
construct an adversary Adv2 as follows. Adv2 simulates Adv1. In the phases Setup,
Phase 1, and Phase 2, Adv2 forwards all messages he receives from Adv1 to the
challenger and all messages from the challenger to Adv1. In the Challenge phase,
Adv2 receives two messages M0 and M1 from Adv1 and the challenge C (which
contains elements Ej that are either e(g,Q)
ajRj or e(g, g)θj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k) from
the challenger. He flips a coin β, multiplies all Ej of C by Mβ, and sends the
resulting ciphertext as C ′ to Adv1. When Adv1 outputs a guess β′, Adv2 outputs
1 if β′ = β, and 0 if β′ 6= β. If the components Ej of C satisfy Ej = e(g,Q)ajRj ,
then Adv2’s challenge given to Adv1 is a well-formed DABE ciphertext and Adv1
has advantage  of guessing the correct β′ = β. If Ej = e(g, g)θj , the challenge is
independent of the messages M0 and M1, so the advantage of Adv2 is 0. Thus, we
have
Pr[Adv2 succeeds] = Pr[Ej = e(g,Q)
ajRj ] Pr[β′ = β |Ej = e(g,Q)ajRj ] +
Pr[Ej = e(g, g)
θj ] Pr[β′ 6= β |Ej = e(g, g)θj ]
≤ 1
2
(
1
2
+ ) +
1
2
· 1
2
=
1 + 
2
and the overall advantage of Adv2 is

2
, as required.
We prove the security of our DABE construction in the generic group using
the Generic Diffie Hellman Exponent assumption (GDHE) as introduced in Sec-
tion 2.4.2. In particular, we show that any polynomial time adversary Adv2, who
plays the modified game cannot have non-negligible advantage to distinguish
e(g,Q)ajRj from e(g, g)θj in his view of the protocol. Lemma 3.1 finally implies
that there exists no efficient successful attacker Adv1 either, which proves the
security of the DABE scheme.
Theorem 3.1. Let Adv2 be a polynomial time adversary in the generic group
model who plays the modified DABE security game and makes q oracle queries.
Then Adv2 has advantage at most O(q
2/p) to win the modified game, where p is
the order of the bilinear group.
Proof. Let Adv2 be a polynomial time adversary against the modified security
game. Adv2 plays against a simulator, who takes over the role of the challenger
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and manages all oracles as outlined in Section 2.4.2. In particular, the simulator
operates in the following way:
Setup. The simulator chooses G, GT , e, g˜ and random exponents p˜, q˜ ∈ Zp.
Furthermore the simulator chooses two random encoding functions ξ, ξT for
the implementation of the group and pairing oracles. The public key is given
to the adversary in encoded form, i.e., the adversary obtains ξ(1), ξ(p˜) and
ξT (q˜) as encoded versions of g, P and e(g,Q).
Phase 1. When the adversary calls CreateUser for some u, the simulator chooses
a random mku ∈ Zp and returns encoded versions ξ(mku) and ξ(q˜ + p˜ ·mku)
of the user keys PK u and SK u.
Whenever the simulator gets a request involving an attribute A that the
adversary has not used before, he chooses a new unique random value mkA,
which simulates the term HSKa(A) of an attribute A maintained by attribute
authority a; the association between values mkA and attributes A is stored
internally by the simulator. If the adversary queries for an attribute A that
was used before, the value mkA is retrieved from storage. During every
request of a public attribute key for A (a call to RequestAttributePK ), the
simulator returns ξ(mkA) and ξT (q˜mkA) as encoded versions of the public
attribute keys PK ′A and PK
′′
A. If queried for a secret attribute key (through
a call to RequestAttributeSK ), the simulator returns ξ(mkumkA) as encoded
secret key SKA,u.
Whenever the adversary makes oracle queries for group operations or the
pairing, the adversary gets the desired result: on input ξT (a) and ξT (b),
the multiplication oracles returns ξT (a+ b) and the division oracle returns
ξT (a− b). Similarly, on input ξ(a) and ξ(b), the multiplication oracle returns
ξ(a+ b) and the division oracle returns ξ(a− b). On input ξ(a) and ξ(b), the
pairing oracle returns ξT (ab).
Challenge. When the adversary asks for a challenge by submitting the access
policy A, the simulator flips a coin b. Then he chooses a random Rj ∈ Zp for
each conjunction in A and computes aj =
∑
A∈Sj mkA. If b = 0, he sets θj to
a random value from Zp, otherwise θj := q˜ajRj. Finally he returns encoded
components of the ciphertext CT j as 〈ξT (θj), ξ(p˜Rj), ξ(ajRj) 〉.
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Phase 2. The simulator behaves as in Phase 1. However, the simulator refuses any
secret attribute key that would give the respective user a set of attributes
satisfying A.
Due to the restriction of the generic group model, all values that the adversary
can access at any time during his attack are either encodings of random values of Zp
(namely 1, p˜, q˜,mku,mkA and θ), encodings of combinations of these values given
by the simulator (such as the term mkumkA which represents SKA,u), or results
of oracle queries, which are encodings of sums and differences of such values. We
keep track of the knowledge of an attacker by using symbolic algebraic expressions
over these variables which represent inputs of oracle queries.
We will now use the General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem as introduced in
Section 2.4.2. By showing that the target polynomial f = q˜ajRj is independent of
the terms the adversary is given according to Definition 2.3, the proof follows from
Theorem 2.1.
After Phase 2, the adversary received the following information from the simulator,
all in encoded form. Since we are only interested in the polynomials and not their
representations, we write x ∈ Pˆ instead of ξ(x) and y ∈ Qˆ instead of ξT (y):
• The public system key PK: p˜ ∈ Pˆ and q˜ ∈ Qˆ (not q˜ ∈ Pˆ , since the adversary
only receives e(g,Q) = e(g, g)q˜ and not gq˜).
• PK u and SK u for an arbitrary number of users. Let N be the number of
users, denote the jth secret user key mk (j)u : mk
(j)
u , q˜ + p˜ ·mk (j)u ∈ Pˆ .
• PK ′A and PK ′′A for an arbitrary number of attributes: mkA ∈ Pˆ and q˜mkA ∈ Qˆ.
• SKA,u for an arbitrary number of attributes and users. Let L(j) be the
attribute list for the jth user: {mk (j)u mkA}A∈L(j) ∈ Pˆ , with the restriction
that for no user u, he has a sufficient set of secret attributes keys that satisfies
A.
• Ej, E ′j, and E ′′j of the challenge ciphertext, i.e., ajRj, p˜Rj ∈ Pˆ and θj ∈ Qˆ,
where θj may be equal to ajRj for all j.
Hence, for N users and a DNF of k conjunctions, the polynomials that he knows
are:
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Pˆ =

1, p˜, {mkA}A,
{mk (j)u , q˜ + p˜ ·mk (j)u }1≤j≤N ,{
mk (j)u mkA
}
A∈L(j),1≤j≤N
,
{p˜Ri, aiRi}1≤i≤k ,
 Qˆ =
(
1, q˜, {q˜mkA}A,
{θi}1≤i≤k
)
where the subset L(j) does not satisfy A for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The polynomial that
he needs to construct is f = q˜ajRj for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We show that he cannot do
this because f is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ) according to Definition 2.3.
As aj and Rj are not contained in Qˆ, f must contain a product of two polynomials
of Pˆ such that each of the components q˜, aj, and Rj is contained in any of the
terms.
First we show how the adversary can find polynomials containing aj =
∑
A∈Sj mkA
in Pˆ , since aj is contained in f . Aside from Ej and E
′′
j , aj can only be constructed
by multiplying polynomials of Pˆ containing mkA for all A ∈ Sj and some j with
1 ≤ j ≤ n. These values occur only in PK ′A, PK ′′A, and SKA,u. Since PK ′′A ∈ GT
(the polynomial is an element of Qˆ), it cannot be used as input of the pairing.
Thus, the only possibility for the attacker is to combine any PK ′A and SKA,u.
Multiplying representations of PK ′A yields polynomials of the form γ
∑
AmkA for
some γ, and multiplying this by SKA,u for some u and A yields polynomials of
the form
∑
u
γumk (j)u ∑
A∈L(j)
γA,umkA
+ γ∑
A
mkA,
for some γ, γu and γA,u. Since the adversary does not have all secret attribute keys
corresponding to one user u to satisfy any conjunction of A, no sum
∑
A γA,umkA
will evaluate to the required aj. Furthermore, the simulator chooses all mkA
randomly, so any oracle query involving any sum over
∑
AmkA with a set of
attributes that does not precisely correspond to the attributes of the challenge A
will not yield a term containing aj. Thus, the first sum of the above term can not
yield aj. The only way that the sum γ
∑
AmkA evaluates to aj for some j is as a
product of corresponding public attribute keys, which is obtained by multiplying
all representations of PK ′A,A ∈ Sj, yielding ξ(aj). It follows, that to construct a
polynomial containing aj , the adversary has no other option than to use either Ej ,
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Table 3.1: Results of pairings
Source Polynomial Pairing with SK u Pairing with E
′
j
(in Pˆ ) (in Qˆ) (in Qˆ)
PK u′ mku′ mku′ q˜ + p˜mkumku′ mkup˜Rj
SK u′ q˜ + p˜mku′ q˜
2 + q˜p˜(mku′ +mku) q˜p˜Rj + p˜
2mkuRj
+ p˜2mkumku′∏
A∈Sj
PK ′A aj q˜aj + p˜mkuaj aj p˜Rj
E ′j p˜Rj q˜p˜Rj + p˜
2mkuRj p˜
2R2j
E ′′j ajRj q˜ajRj + p˜mkuajRj aj p˜R
2
j
E ′′j , or
∏
A∈Sj PK
′
A. Other polynomials containing mkA are not useful for him.
Next we consider how to obtain terms containing q˜ ·Rj . None of the values of Pˆ
or Qˆ contains both q˜ and Rj. Thus to get a polynomial containing the product
q˜ · Rj, two polynomials of Pˆ need to be multiplied, where each of the values is
contained in any term. The only polynomials in Pˆ that contain q˜ are SK u. We
examine all possible results from multiplying γSK u with some other value. As
shown above, we need not consider polynomials containing mkA, since these are
not useful for the adversary.
The first three columns of Table 3.1 list all remaining combinations. It can be
seen that the only result that contains all q˜, aj and Rj is the product of some SKu
and some E ′′j which results in a polynomial of the form
p˜Rjmkuaj + q˜ajRj.
In order to obtain the required term q˜ajRj, the adversary has to eliminate
p˜Rjmkuaj, which can be done by a division with another term of Qˆ if Qˆ contains
a polynomial p˜Rjmkuaj. To construct this, he needs to multiply a polynomial
from Pˆ containing p˜ with another polynomial from Pˆ . Thus we need to examine
all possible results from pairing SK u or E
′
j (the only elements of Pˆ depending on
p˜) with another value. Once again, Table 3.1 lists all possible combinations not
containing terms involving results of the hash oracle. (Including terms given by
the oracles one gets terms of the above form that will not help, either.)
From this case analysis it follows that no term of the form p˜Rjmkuaj can be
constructed by the adversary Adv2, so f is independent of the terms (Pˆ , Qˆ) by
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our Definition 2.3. This allows us to apply Theorem 2.1 to conclude that the
adversary’s advantage is O(q2/p), proving the theorem.
3.4.3. Implementation and Performance
Compared to other ABE schemes, the proposed DABE construction is very efficient.
Nearly all operations are group operations in G and GT . The only computationally
expensive operation, the pairing e : G × G → GT , is needed during decryption
exactly two times, no matter how complex the access policy is. No pairings are
needed for any other algorithms. In all other known ABE schemes, the number of
pairings grows at least linearly with the minimum number of distinct attributes
needed for decryption. Furthermore, each conjunction requires only three group
elements in the ciphertext, regardless of the number of attributes involved in the
conjunction.
To further demonstrate the high efficiency of our DABE construction, we imple-
mented it in C using the PBC library [Lyn] and compared it to the implementation
of Bethencourt’s original CP-ABE scheme [BSW07] (henceforth simply called
CP-ABE) which is also built on PBC. To make the comparison as fair as possible,
both implementations were linked against the same PBC instance and both used
similar curves, i.e., curves of the PBC-predefined type denoted Type A that are
based on the equation y2 = x3 + x.
We created 1 000 000 random alphanumeric strings of length 10-20. These strings
were used as attribute descriptors and all tests were run with subsets of this
attribute list. As a first test, we created a large set of attribute keys (10 000
and 100 000) using both implementations. For DABE, both RequestAttributePK
and RequestAttributeSK were executed for each attribute, and for CP-ABE, the
algorithm KeyGen was called to create a key ring containing keys for all given
attributes. In the next step, a random group element was encrypted and then
decrypted with a large conjunction of attributes (100, 2 500, and 5 000). For
CP-ABE, the function bswabe enc was used. Note that when given policies that
are not simple conjunctions, both implementations will need to find a conjunction
of attributes that satisfies the policy and apply computations to all attributes
of the conjunction. Thus, testing only one large conjunction is sufficient for a
representative performance comparison. Also, note that in real world settings, a
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KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt
# of attributes: 10 000 100 000 100 2 500 5 000 100 2 500 5 000
CP-ABE [BSW07] 101 988 1.084 25.585 56.106 0.401 24.305 80.941
Our construction 52 465 0.006 0.036 0.066 0.004 0.029 0.056
Table 3.2: Performance comparison of DABE and Bethencourt’s CP-ABE (all
values given in seconds)
hybrid encryption will usually be utilized, where a single random group element
will be chosen for ABE encryption and a binary representation of it (for example
computed by a hash function H : GT → {0, 1}k for an integer k) is used to
symmetrically encrypt an actual message. We will use such an approach in our
Web Service implementation later in Chapter 6.
All tests were performed on a standard desktop PC equipped with an Intel
Core 2 Duo processor at 3 GHz and 4 GB bytes of RAM running Kubuntu Linux.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results (all time values are given in seconds).
As it can be seen, DABE outperforms CP-ABE in every aspect. The large
difference in the KeyGen phase can be explained by the fact that CP-ABE is
probabilistic and requires the computation of a pseudorandom value for each
attribute. DABE, on the other hand, creates two keys (whereas in CP-ABE
the public attribute key is the attribute name itself), but altogether only three
exponentiations and two hashes are needed for each attribute. For Decrypt, the
large differences (factor 103) are obviously caused by the different numbers of
pairings required for decryption: In CP-ABE two pairings must be computed
for each attribute of the conjunction, resulting in a superlinear growth of the
time required for decryption, while DABE requires only two pairing operations
regardless of the number of attributes involved. Instead, the only action that is
dependent on the number of attributes is the multiplication of the private attribute
keys associated with each attribute.
3.5. Enhancing Waters’ Construction
3.5.1. Modified Construction
It is easy to modify the CP-ABE constructions from [Wat11] in order to obtain
a DABE construction since the structure of the secret attribute keys is similar
52
3.5. Enhancing Waters’ Construction
to the DABE construction given in the preceding section. For this construction
the access policy A must be given as a linear secret sharing scheme. For a formal
definition of secret sharing schemes and access structures we refer the reader to
[Sti92]. We define a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) as follows [Bei96]:
Definition 3.1. A secret-sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is called linear
(over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix M called the share-generating matrix for Π. The
Matrix M has ` rows and n columns. Let ρ : {1, . . . , `} → P a function
that maps each row of M to a party. When we consider the column vector
v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp
are randomly chosen, then Mv is the vector of ` shares of the secret s
according to Π. The share λi := (Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
We will not discuss share-generating matrices in detail here, but give an intuition.
Consider the following example:
ρ :=

(1, A),
(2, B),
(3, C)
 M :=

1 1
1 0
0 −1

As described above, the column vector v = (s, r1), so the first share is λ1 =
(Mv)1 = s+ r1 and is given to ρ(1) = A, the second share is λ2 = s and is given
to ρ(2) = B, and the third share is λ3 = −r1 which is given to ρ(3) = C. Note
thatM and ρ are publicy known. With these shares, s can be reconstructed by B
alone and by A and C together (by adding their shares), so the matrix represents
the formula B ∨ (A ∧ C).
It has been shown in [Bei96] that if S is a set of parties that is allowed to receive
the secret according to Π (i.e., an authorized subset of the access structure realized
by Π) and I = {i | ρ(i) ∈ S} is the set of rows ofM corresponding to the elements
of S, then there exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I , such that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s for the
shares λi = (Mv)i = Miv. These constants can be found in polynomial time.
In our setting, the parties P resemble attributes, so an encryptor first needs to
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formulate his access policy as a secret sharing scheme Π and construct a matrix
M along with a row-labeling function ρ for it.
In general, a LSSS matrix can be efficiently generated from any policy. A simple
approach is sketched in Appendix D of [LW11]. More recently, a very efficient
algorithm was proposed in [LC10]. Moreover, as that algorithm is deterministic,
the LSSS matrix needs not be included along with the ciphertext. If both parties
(encryptor and decryptor) use the same algorithm to create theM and ρ, it suffices
to send the policy. In fact, this is the preferred approach as the policy is a lot
more readable than a LSSS matrix, and the decryptor should be able to easily
understand the rules under which decryption is possible.
After the encryptor has createdM and ρ for his policy, he also needs the public
keys PKA of all attributes used in the access policy as input to the encryption
algorithm. Using the notation from Section 3.4, the construction is as follows:
Setup(1k) The Setup algorithm chooses a pairing e : G×G→ GT of order p. Next
it chooses a generator g ∈ G, and two random group elements P,Q ∈ G. The
public key of the system is PK = {G,GT , e, g, P, e(g,Q)}, while the secret
master key is given by MK = Q.
CreateUser(PK ,MK , u) The algorithm CreateUser chooses a secret mku ∈ Zp
and outputs the public key PK u := g
mku and the private key SK u :=
MK · Pmku = Q · Pmku for user u.
CreateAuthority(PK , a) The algorithm CreateAuthority chooses uniformly and
randomly a hash function Hxa : {0, 1}∗ → Zp from a large finite family of
hash functions, which we model as random oracles. It returns as secret key
the index of the hash function SK a := xa.
RequestAttributePK(PK ,A, SK a) If A is handled by the attribute authority a,
RequestAttributePK returns the public attribute key of A: PKA := gHSKa (A).
RequestAttributeSK(PK ,A, SK a, u,PK u) After determining that the attribute
A is handled by a, the authority tests whether user u is eligible for the
attribute A. If this is not the case, RequestAttributeSK returns NULL, else it
outputs the secret attribute key SKA,u := PK uHSKa (A) = gmkuHSKa (A).
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CT =
〈
C = Me(g,Q)s, C ′ = gs,
C1 = P
λ1PK ρ(1)
−r1 , D1 = gr1 ,
. . .
C` = P
λ`PK ρ(`)
−r` , D` = gr`
〉
.
Figure 3.5: Ciphertext in Water’s construction
Encrypt(PK ,M,A,PKA1 , . . . ,PKAN ) Given an access policy of the form A =
〈M, ρ〉, Encrypt chooses a random vector ~v = (s, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Zn+1p . For
i = 1 to `, it calculates the share λi =Mi · v. In addition, it chooses random
elements r1, . . . , r` ∈ Zp. The complete ciphertext is given in Figure 3.5
Decrypt(PK ,CT ,A, SK u, SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u) The algorithm first verifies that
the access structure A can be satisfied by the attributes of SKA1,u, . . . ,
SKAN ,u. If not, it aborts, returning NULL, else it proceeds as follows: Let I
be the set of all row indices of M that are associated with the attributes
of SKA1,u, . . . , SKAN ,u, i.e., I = {i | ρ(i) ∈ {A1, . . . ,AN}}. As noted above,
there are constants {ωi | i ∈ I} so that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s, that can be found in
polynomial time. The algorithm computes
e(C ′, SK u)/
(∏
i∈I
(e(Ci,PK u) · e(Di, SKρ(i),u))ωi
)
= e(g,Q)s (3.3)
and divides the ciphertext component C by this value, thus retrieving M .
The only major difference to the construction from Section 3.4 is in the algorithms
Encrypt and Decrypt.
Correctness. Decryption works if the set of attributes given as input to the
Decrypt algorithm satisfies the access structure A. In the CPA security proof in
Section 3.5.2 we will show that decryption is not possible if the attribute set is not
sufficient. If, however, it is sufficient, Equation (3.3) yields the correct result as
follows:
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e(C ′, SK u)/
(∏
i∈I
(e(Ci,PK u) · e(Di, SKρ(i),u))ωi
)
= e(gs, QPmku)/
(∏
i∈I
(e(P λiPK−riρ(i),PK u) · e(gri ,PKHSKa (A)u )ωi
)
= e(gs, QPmku)/(∏
i∈I
(e(P λig−riHSKa (A), gmku) · e(gri , gmkuHSKa (A)))ωi
)
. (3.4)
For any pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT with generators g1, g2 and a, b, c ∈ Zp the
following equations hold:
e(ga1 , g
b
2 · gc2) = e(ga1 , g2)b+c = e(ga1 , gb2) · e(ga1 , gc2) and
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g
b
1, g
a
2) .
For symmetric groups (G = G1 = G2), the last equation implies that the pairing
operation is commutative, i.e., ∀A,B ∈ G, e(A,B) = e(B,A). Using these rules,
Equation (3.4) can be split up and rearranged as follows:
(3.4) = e(g,Q)s · e(g, P )smku/(∏
i∈I
(e(g, P )λimku · e(g, g)−riHSKa (A)mku · e(g, g)riHSKa (A)mku)ωi
)
= e(g,Q)s · e(g, P )smku/
(∏
i∈I
(e(g, P )λimku)ωi
)
= e(g,Q)s · e(g, P )smku/e(g, P )
∑
i∈I ωiλimku
= e(g,Q)s · e(g, P )smku/e(g, P )smku
= e(g,Q)s .
As seen in the Decrypt algorithm, if the ciphertext component C is divided by this
value, the result is the plaintext message M , so the decryption succeeds.
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3.5.2. CPA-Security
We prove the security of this construction in two ways. First we show how to apply
Waters’ original proof to the DABE version. This proof allows a security reduction
to a mathematical assumption. However, the reduction requires a very restrictive
security model. We call this non-adaptive security. The construction can also be
proven secure in the stricter adaptive security model that was used in the previous
DABE construction by using the General Diffie Hellman Exponent Assumption
(Section 2.4.2).
Non-adaptive Security. To prove the security of his construction, Waters [Wat11]
uses a security assumption that he introduces in his paper, the decisional q-parallel
Bilinear Diffie Hellman Exponent assumption. He shows that any adversary who
breaks the scheme can be used to construct an algorithm that breaks the decisional
q-parallel BDHE assumption.
This proof also works for the DABE modification. However, we have to weaken
the attack model that is considered. In particular we allow only non-adaptive key
queries, similar to the Multi-Authority Threshold ABE scheme by Chase [Cha07]:
In this scheme, a sequence of calls of CreateUser to request user keys for a user u
and an arbitrary number of calls to RequestAttributeSK to request all attributes
for u are treated as a single call. The adversary will only get the user keys and
secret attribute keys after having submitted the complete set of attributes for
the user. This means that an adversary is not able to adaptively request secret
attribute keys to users, but needs to define the whole set of attributes that a user
has at once. If an adversary wants to add attributes to a user he has already
created, he can instead create a new user by submitting another sequence of
CreateUser, RequestAttributeSK calls. Note that due to the CP-ABE property of
collusion-resistance he cannot mix the new keys with the old ones, so he has to
create the new key ring containing all required attributes for the user. Note that
this constraint prevents the attacker from utilizing the complete flexibility of the
DABE scheme.
We also need to change the scheme to a selectively secure scheme, where the
adversary submits the challenge access structure to the challenger in advance
during an additional Init phase (see Section 2.4.1). The attack model is as follows:
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Initialization. The adversary submits a challenge access structure A to the chal-
lenger that he wants to be challenged on.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the global key PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary asks the challenger for an arbitrary number of public
attribute keys, which the challenger creates by calling RequestAttributePK.
The adversary also requests an arbitrary number of users by calling Crea-
teUser and secret attribute keys for each user by calling RequestAttributeSK.
However, each sequence of attribute claims for a user is considered a single
call, so the dispatch of the secret user keys and secret attribute keys for
each user is stalled until the adversary has called RequestAttributeSK for all
attributes that he wants the user to have. The adversary cannot request a
set of secret attribute keys that would give a user the ability to satisfy A.
During the first request for a public or private key for an attribute of an
authority a, the challenger creates the authority by a call to CreateAuthority ;
he stores the secret authority key for future use (but does not make the key
available to the attacker).
Challenge. The adversary submits two messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips
a coin b, encrypts Mb under A, and gives the ciphertext CT to the adversary.
Phase 2. Like in Phase 1, the adversary may create an arbitrary number of users
along with secret attribute keys for them. He can not add secret attribute
keys to users that he has already created, and as before, if any request is
made for a set of user keys that would satisfy A, the challenger aborts.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
As in the original security definition, the advantage of the adversary is defined
as  = Pr[b′ = b] − 1
2
, where the probability is taken over all coin tosses of both
challenger and adversary. The scheme is called non-adaptive key query secure
if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the
non-adaptive DABE game.
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This modified model is from an adversary’s point of view equal to the model of
[Wat11]. Thus, the proof of [Wat11], Section 4.1, can directly be applied to the
above construction.
Adaptive Security. However, using generic groups we can also prove security
in the strict security game (see Section 3.3.2) similar to our original DABE
construction. Similarly to the proof in Section 3.4.2, we define a modified game
that is used by an adversary Adv2:
The phases Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 are equal to the original game. In
the Challenge phase, the adversary submits an access policy A such that none of
the users that he created in Phase 1 satisfies A. The challenger flips a coin b, and
creates a ciphertext for the access policy A according to Eq. (3.1), but instead of
computing the ciphertext component C as in the construction, he computes C as
C =
e(g,Q)s, if b = 1e(g, g)θ, if b = 0 .
Lemma 3.2. If there exists an adversary Adv1 who has advantage of  to win the
original game, then there exists an adversary Adv2 which wins the modified game
with advantage /2.
The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. Let Adv2 be a polynomial time adversary in the generic group
model who plays the modified DABE security game and makes q oracle queries.
Then Adv2 has advantage at most O(q
2/p) to win the modified game, where p is
the order of the bilinear group.
Proof. The challenger plays the modified game by using the oracles to compute
representations of all terms similarly to the challenger that is described in the
proof of the original DABE construction. To emulate the random group elements
P and Q, we write P = gp˜ and Q = gq˜ for p˜, q˜
R←−Z∗p, so e(g,Q)s = e(g, g)q˜s.
As before, we use the GDHE assumption to prove this theorem. In order to
prove the security, we need to show that the adversary’s target polynomial f = q˜s
is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ), where Pˆ and Qˆ are the polynomials he receives from the
challenger. We begin by examining Pˆ and Qˆ.
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After the challenge phase, the adversary has the following polynomials:
• The public system key PK: p˜ ∈ Pˆ and q˜ ∈ Qˆ (not q˜ ∈ Pˆ , since the adversary
only receives e(g,Q) = e(g, g)q˜ and not gq˜).
• Public attribute keys for all attributes: {HSKa(A)}A ∈ Pˆ . Since we model
H as a random oracle, all hash values are independent from each other and
from any other values in the system.
• For an arbitrary number of users u the public and secret user keys and
for each u secret attribute keys for a number of attributes: Let N be the
number of users, denote the jth user u(j), his secret user key mk (j)u and his
set of attributes L(j). Then the polynomials are mk (j)u , q˜ + p˜mk
(j)
u ∈ Pˆ and
{mkuHSKa(A)}A∈L(j) ∈ Pˆ .
However, for no j does L(j) satisfy the challenge access structure A.
• The ciphertext components:
– The component C ′: s ∈ Pˆ .
– The component C: θ ∈ Qˆ, where θ is either q˜s or a random value.
– For 1 ≤ i ≤ ` (with ` the number of rows of the LSSS matrix M), the
components Ci and Di: p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri, ri ∈ Pˆ for random ri and
the shares λ(i).
Thus the vectors are:
Pˆ =

1, p˜, s,{
mk (j)u , q˜ + p˜mk
(j)
u
}
1≤j≤N
,
{HSKa(A)}A,{
mk (j)u HSKa(A)
}
A∈L(j),1≤j≤N
,
{p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri, ri}1≤i≤`

,
Qˆ = (1, q˜, θ) and f = q˜s.
First we examine how the adversary can build polynomials containing q˜. This
value occurs in Qˆ as q˜ ∈ Qˆ and as part of the polynomials q˜ + p˜mk (j)u ∈ Pˆ for any
user u(j). A term in Qˆ can not be multiplied with any other term, so f = q˜s ∈ Qˆ
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can not be computed from q˜ ∈ Qˆ, and the only way to have q˜s as an addend is to
multiply q˜ + p˜mk (j)u with a value that contains s.
Now we examine how to construct such a polynomial containing s, but with
the restriction that s does not have an additional factor x. If s was part of sx
for some x, then the multiplication with q˜ + p˜mk (j)u would yield a polynomial
of Qˆ containing q˜sx, which still contains x as a term. However, x cannot be
removed from this polynomial, as after one multiplication the result is in Qˆ and
no further multiplication is possible. The vector Pˆ contains s ∈ Pˆ , which could be
used, but there is potentially another way to construct a polynomial containing s:
Since
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s, a polynomial containing s can be computed using the terms
p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri. However, the resulting polynomial would have p˜ as factor of s
which cannot be removed.
Thus, f = q˜s can only be computed by multiplying q˜ + p˜mk (j)u (for any j) with
s ∈ Pˆ , resulting in sq˜ + sp˜mk (j)u , so the adversary needs to build sp˜mk (j)u in order
to remove it and arrive at the desired term f = q˜s.
Again, s occurs only in two polynomials: s ∈ Pˆ and in the form p˜λi−HSKa(ρ(i))ri.
To compute sp˜mk (j)u from s ∈ Pˆ , the adversary needs a term of Pˆ containing both
p˜ and mk (j)u . However, these two values are only both contained in q˜ + p˜mk
(j)
u , but
when using this to remove sp˜mk (j)u , the adversary would also cancel out the target
polynomial q˜s.
So the adversary needs to multiply a suitable linear combination of p˜λi −
HSKa(ρ(i))ri for some i with a polynomial containing mk
(j)
u . All possible multipli-
cation results are:
(p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri) ·mk (j)u = p˜λimk (j)u −HSKa(ρ(i))rimk (j)u (3.5)
(p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri) · (q˜ + p˜mk (j)u ) = p˜2mk (j)u λi + p˜q˜λi − q˜HSKa(ρ(i))ri
− p˜mk (j)u HSKa(ρ(i))ri (3.6)
(p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri) ·mk (j)u HSKa(A) = p˜λimk (j)u HSKa(A)−H2SKa(ρ(i))rimk (j)u
(3.7)
Only equation (3.5) on the first line contains a term that can be used to construct
p˜smk (j)u . Determining a set I and coefficients ωi such that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s, the
adversary can create a linear combination of the product (3.5) that contains the
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desired polynomial:
∑
i∈I
(
ωi · (p˜λi −HSKa(ρ(i))ri) ·mk (j)u
)
=
∑
i∈I
p˜ωiλimk
(j)
u − (ωi ·HSKa(ρ(i))rimk (j)u )
= p˜smk (j)u −
∑
i∈I
(ωi ·HSKa(ρ(i))rimk (j)u ) .
(Note that scalar multiplication is still possible in Qˆ because addition is possible
in Qˆ.)
In order to eliminate the right-hand term, the adversary finally needs to build
polynomials of the form HSKa(ρ(i))rimk
(j)
u for the same j that was used for the
rest of the computation and for all i ∈ I. The only other term that contains ri is
ri ∈ Pˆ , so the adversary needs to multiply ri with a polynomial that contains both
HSKa(A) and mk (j)u . The only term that qualifies is HSKa(A)mk (j)u ∈ Pˆ , which
represents a private attribute key. Now the important observation is that no user
satisfies the LSSS matrix. This means that for each possible I, with
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s,
there is at least one non-null coefficient ωi where ρ(i) points to an attribute that
is not element of L(j), i.e., there is no corresponding secret attribute key for the
jth user. Thus, the adversary will arrive at a polynomial of the form
q˜s−
∑
i
HSKa(ρ(i))rimk
(j)
u ,
where the right-most sum contains at least one element that cannot be removed
by the adversary. It follows that f = q˜s is independent of (Pˆ , Qˆ).
3.5.3. Performance
Since ` pairings are needed for decryption, the complexity is obviously linear in
the number of rows of the secret sharing matrixM. Since ` ≥ n (linear dependant
columns can be eliminated), ` is a measure for the complexity of the matrix.
In general, the size of M can grow exponentially in the size of the policy, but
depending on the structure of the desired access policy, smaller matrices can be
found [LC10, LW11].
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3.6. Conclusion
CP-ABE is a promising concept for next-generation access control and arguably
the most interesting technology to implement data-centric security at the moment.
However, to be usable in a pervasive and highly distributed environment, its
extension to settings with multiple authorities is necessary. In this chapter, we
proposed a scheme where an arbitrary, non-static set of independent attribute
authorities is able to issue attributes to users, taking as input only public user
keys and the names of the attributes. A central trusted authority is only needed
for the creation of users. Later in Chapters 5 and 6 we will discuss the practical
implications of such an architecture and demonstrate how this can be used in
real-world settings.
We also proposed a DABE construction that supports every possible access
policy expressed in DNF and proved its CPA security in the Generic Group Model.
Our performance analysis of an implementation of that construction showed that
all algorithms are much more efficient than conventional CP-ABE. This can be
explained by the fact that the construction uses only a constant number of pairing
operations, while in conventional CP-ABE, that number is linearly dependent on
the size of the policy. Furthermore, we showed how a recent CP-ABE construction
can be extended to fit the DABE scheme. We proved the security of that second
construction both in the Generic Group Model and – by using a relaxed, weaker
security model – in the form of a reduction proof.
In both constructions, the size of the ciphertext might be exponential in the
size of the policy, depending on its structure. However, in practical settings, both
constructions are likely to achieve small ciphertexts.
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Chapter4
Hiding the Policy
4.1. Introduction
In most CP-ABE constructions, the policy is sent along with the ciphertext. This
appears sensible as the decryptor needs to know which of his attributes are needed
to access the data. However, the policy itself might be considered worth to protect
as it might reveal clues to the content of the encrypted data. For example, consider
a patient report in a hospital setting that is encrypted with a policy that allows
encryption only by parties with the role neurologist or gerontologist. This policy
alone reveals some information about the content, i.e., the patient seems to be
advanced in years and might have a neurological condition. Thus, policy privacy
can be an essential feature.
4.1.1. Towards Policy Privacy
Currently, there are two approaches to realize policy privacy. The first and most
well-understood approach is predicate encryption (PE), which can be seen as a
generalization of ABE in which policies are hidden. Unfortunately, while some PE
constructions today are very expressive, they are still quite limited: No particular
PE instance is able to support every possible Boolean formula and PE policies
are often formulated in unintuitive or inefficient ways. (We will elaborate on
this important aspect later on.) This is contrary to our goal of offering high
expressiveness and intuitive policies.
The second approach, which we are concerned with here, is to modify common
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CP-ABE constructions to somehow hide the policy while still allow an eligible user
to decrypt. We first examine that a policy can never been completely hidden in a
ciphertext, as it has to be stored in a finite space and a known format, so there is
always a limited, finite set of possible policies that can be encoded in a particular
ciphertext. This motivates to introduce the notion of policy anonymity, which
is similar to the established notion of anonymity sets [SD02] and k-anonymity
[CdVFS07]: Given a number of candidates for a policy, the anonymity set, an
attacker cannot determine which actual policy was used for the encryption.
Extending a CP-ABE construction to support a policy hiding feature has been
attempted by Nishide et al. [NYO09] and Yu et al. [YRL08], both of which extend
the CP-ABE scheme of [CN07], where the policy consists of a single AND-gate.
Simply speaking, in these extensions the policy is still an AND-gate, but the
decryptor does not now the particular configuration and has to apply all his
attribute keys to decrypt. In both cases the anonymity set consists of all policies
that consists of a single AND-gate over a subset of all attributes of the system.
In this chapter we show that one of Nishide’s CP-ABE constructions [NYO09]
can be modified in order to support the encryption with every Boolean formula by
combining several AND-gates in a specific way and using a novel idea from graph
theory. This in turn allows the encryptor to choose a particular anonymity set
which contains – among with the original policy – many more.
The idea of the construction is as follows: Given a policy, represented by a
Boolean syntax tree with ∧ and ∨-gates, we construct a major of this tree, i.e., a
supertree that is built by expanding nodes of the original tree into new subtrees.
Such a major can be used to express many different policies by assigning different
expressions to its leaves. The set of all such policies makes up the anonymity set.
The decryptor knows only that the used policy is among all policies that can be
encoded by the supertree. The leaves of this major are encryptions of blinded
partial secrets that represent ∧-gates. As these ∧-gates are hidden, an adversary
does not know which of the possible policies of the anonymity set is used in the
encryption, but by our construction he is still able to decrypt the message if he
fulfills the hidden policy. He will determine which of the leaves he is able to satisfy,
obtain some of the encoded partial secrets, combine them according to the tree
structure using his private key, and unblind the resulting combination to retrieve
the secret. Our application of Nishide’s construction takes collusion attacks into
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∧
∨ ∨
v1 v2 v3 v4
←− leaves hidden by construction
Figure 4.1: Sample obfuscated policy
P1 : RoleA ∧ (RoleB ∨ RoleC)
P2 : (adult ∨ cc = verified) ∧
((contprov1.article1 = purchased ∧ account1 = balanced) ∨
(contprov2.article1 = purchased ∧ account2 = balanced))
P3 : userrole = surgeon ∧ employer = hospitalx
P4 : ((x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3) ∨ x4) ∧ ((x5 ∧ x6) ∨ (x7 ∧ x8 ∧ x9 ∧ x10))
Figure 4.2: Example policies for Figure 4.1
account, so no group of users (who fulfill different parts of a policy) can decrypt
the policy unless one member of the group fulfills the complete policy.
Example To give an intuition of the hiding property of our system, examine the
tree in Figure 4.1 which may be sent along with the ciphertext. It represents the
structure of a policy anonymity set, and its topology is known to everyone, but
the leaves are hidden using the ideas of Nishide’s construction. Each leaf hides
an ∧-gate with an unknown configuration. Each ∧-gate could also represent the
constant values ⊥ (false) or > (true). Figure 4.2 shows some policies that might be
encoded with this tree. Consider, for example, policy P4. In our construction, each
of x1, . . . , x10 may represent an expression of the form A = x for an attribute A and
an attribute value x. Here, the leaf v1 could encode the expression v1 ≡ x1∧x2∧x3,
v2 could encode v2 ≡ x4, v3 ≡ x5 ∧ x6, and v4 ≡ x7 ∧ x8 ∧ x9 ∧ x10. There are
various ways to encode simpler policies like x1 ∧ x2 or x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3). For example,
the former policy can be encoded by mapping, v1 ≡ ⊥, v2 ≡ x1 ∧ x2 v3 ≡ >, and
v4 to a random ∧-gate, or by mapping v1 ≡ x1, v2 ≡ ⊥, v3 ≡ x2, and v4 ≡ ⊥.
Several other mappings are possible. This small example already shows that the
policies encoded in a simple tree can be very complex and diverse.
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An attacker cannot know the concrete semantics of the leaves, but he can
determine if an attribute set satisfies the partial policy of a leaf. We will use this
ability in the decryption algorithm.
4.1.2. Related Work
In predicate encryption schemes [LOS+10, KSW08, SBC+07, BW07], decryption
is possible if a predicate over the user attributes and the ciphertext attributes is
fulfilled. Current PE constructions are very powerful and support rather expressive
predicates. Currently the most versatile solutions seem to be those that use inner
product queries [LOS+10, KSW08]. It has been shown [KSW08] that such a scheme
can be used to construct a scheme that supports, for example, DNFs or CNFs
of some bounded degree, or a predicate that can be expressed by a polynomial
over the attributes. However, this predicate (for example a predicate for DNFs of
some degree d) is encoded in the user keys, so it is fixed after the key generation
algorithm. The complexity of the system is dependent on the size of that predicate.
This means that no single PE scheme is able to express every possible policy in
polynomial size and due to the bounded size of the predicate can only support a
limited set of policies. Speaking in terms of anonymity, there is a fixed anonymity
set that applies to all ciphertexts of an instantiation of a PE system.
In our approach, there is no fixed anonymity set. Instead, each encrypting party
decides on the anonymity set while encrypting. All policies are expressed as syntax
trees, so every Boolean formula can be expressed in polynomial size. As we will
show in Section 4.4.1, the anonymity set is exponential in the size of the tree major
that was used to encode the policy.
Furthermore it should be noted that predicate encryption schemes require very
large groups and are only efficient for small attribute sets thereby making them
infeasible for many applications.
Aside from PE schemes, policy privacy has also been examined in the context of
trust negotiation [FLA06]. Here, large scrambled circuits are used to obfuscate
the underlying policy, which is similar to our idea of using large tree majors.
Trust negotiation is an interactive process whereas in this thesis we are concerned
with an off-line access control mechanism. Recently, Seyalioglu and Sahai [SS10]
proposed an encryption scheme which also uses garbled circuits and hides the
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policy. However, in their scheme, the public key of a recipient must be used for
the encryption, making it infeasible in the CP-ABE setting where the identities of
the recipients are not known.
Outline In the following section we discuss how to obfuscate policies by creating
syntax tree majors. The syntax tree majors are then used in our CP-ABE system
described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses various security aspects of this system.
Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Syntax Tree Majors
The basic idea of our system is to take a policy, encoded as a monotonic syntax
tree, and find another policy that semantically contains many different policies,
including the original one. Seeing only the ciphertext, one is not able to decide
which policy was actually used for the encryption.
Definition 4.1 (monotonic syntax tree). A monotonic syntax tree T is a tree
where all inner nodes are labeled with either ∧ or ∨ and the leaves represent either
Boolean variables or the constant values ⊥ or >. If the root of T is labeled ∧, then
every inner node of odd depth is labeled ∨, and every inner node of even depth is
labeled ∧. We call such a tree ∧-rooted. Analogously, a ∨-rooted tree is a tree
whose root is labeled ∨ and where every inner node of odd depth is labeled ∧, and
every inner node of even depth is labeled ∨.
It is easy to see that any syntax tree over the operands ∧ and ∨ can be
transformed into a monotonic syntax tree by contracting adjacent ∧- and ∨-nodes.
As the labeling of all inner nodes follows from the labeling of the root node, we
usually omit the labels of the inner nodes, calling the resulting tree implicitly
labeled.
As explained in the introduction, we will use a CP-ABE scheme that encrypts the
leaves, which correspond to attributes, but the construction will hide the concrete
correspondence between leaves and attributes. Also note that our construction
supports only monotonic syntax trees, but as there might be negative attributes
(i.e., attributes that attest that the possessor does not have a certain property),
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Figure 4.3: Monotonic syntax tree
even non-monotonic policies can be represented by monotonic syntax trees by
applying DeMorgan’s laws until all negations are atomic.
In order to further obfuscate the policy, we compute a larger policy such that
by mapping some of its leaves to the values > and ⊥ we are able to encode the
original policy. For example, the monotonic syntax tree in Figure 4.3 represents
the formula x∧z. As an adversary does not know which leaves (if any) are mapped
to > and ⊥, there are many possible forms the encoded policy might have. As the
configuration of the leaves is hidden, he is not able to access the concrete policy.
We say that the larger policy semantically contains many smaller policies. More
formally:
Definition 4.2 (semantic containment). Let F and G be Boolean formulas over
vectors of Boolean variables ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), resp. ~y = (y1, . . . , ym) where m ≤ n.
We call F semantically contained in G if there exists a function φ that maps the
variables of ~x to either variables of ~y or to constant values > or ⊥, such that
G(ψ(φ(~x))) = F (ψ(~x)) for all configuration mappings ψ : ~x 7→ {⊥,>}n.
We can apply this definition to syntax trees as follows: Let Q be a monotonic
syntax tree with leaves L(Q) =
{
u1, . . . , u|L(Q)|
}
and R a monotonic syntax tree
with leaves L(R) =
{
v1, . . . , v|L(R)|
}
. We say that R semantically contains Q, if
there is a function φ : L(R) → L(Q) ∪ {⊥,>} such that for all configurations
ψ : L(Q)→ {>,⊥}, it holds that ψ(φ(R)) ≡ ψ(Q), i.e., after applying φ to R, it
computes the same value as Q for every possible configuration of the variables.
The type of supertree we examine is closely related to the notion of tree majors.
Informally, a tree R is a major of a tree Q, if Q can be obtained from R by
contracting a number of edges. Equally, a major of Q can be constructed by
expanding some nodes into subtrees. A major can be characterized by a mapping
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Q
Rf
T = R
[
f−1(a)
]a
Figure 4.4: A mapping f of a major to a minor (leaves omitted)
f : V (R)→ V (Q) of vertexes of a tree R to Q. For details we refer the reader to
the extensive literature about smallest common supertrees and related topics, for
example, [RV06, Val05, RB09]. Also, for a good, though somewhat dated, survey
see [Bil05]. However, the specific constraints we are dealing with in our scenario
have to our knowledge not yet been discussed.
We call R a syntax tree major of Q if we can find a mapping f with the following
properties: Given a node a ∈ Q, the nodes of f−1(a) form a connected subtree T
of R, which we denote T = R [f−1(a)]. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Different
subtrees must not overlap and all edges of Q must be preserved in R. This is
similar to the definition of a tree major.
However, in our scenario we additionally require the expanded tree to preserve
the labeling of all nodes, as it needs to have the same semantics as the original
tree. To understand the implications of this, let the label of a in Figure 4.4 be
∨. All other labels of Q follow from this by Definition 4.1. Now consider the
subtree T of R. As our definition does not allow adjacent ∨-nodes, some nodes of
T must be labeled ∧. However, as both the direct predecessor of T in R and all
direct successors of T in R are labeled with ∧, no node of T can have the label ∧.
From this consideration, it follows that all subtrees introduced in a tree major of a
syntax tree must have even height.
Both R1 and R2 of Figure 4.5 are examples of such majors. Note the placements
of the leaves a and b. In both cases, the root of the smallest subgraph that contains
both nodes has a root labeled with ∨. This node will take on the role that the
parent of f(a) and f(b) in Q has (which is also an ∨-node).
Generally, all syntax tree majors must follow the rule that if two nodes a and b
have a common parent in Q, then their unique common ancestor in R must have
the same label as that parent. As a counter example consider the tree major R3 in
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Figure 4.5: Two valid syntax tree majors
Figure 4.6, where the root of the smallest subtree containing a and b is an ∧-node,
thus not qualifying as a syntax tree major. The original graph contained a formula
f(a) ∨ f(b), but this cannot be encoded in the given major, as a and b are only
connected by an ∧-node. It is now easy to see that in these cases the smallest
subtrees containing a and b must have odd height.
More formally, we adapt the definition of tree minors from [NRT99] to implicitly
labeled monotonic syntax trees and define syntax tree majors as follows:
Definition 4.3 (syntax tree major). A tree R is a syntax tree major of a tree Q
if there exists a surjection f : V (R)→ V (Q) such that
1. for each a ∈ V (Q), T = R [f−1(a)] is a connected subtree of R, and every
path from the root of T to a leaf of T consists of an even number of edges;
2. for each pair a, b ∈ V (Q), f−1(a) ∩ f−1(b) = ∅;
3. for S = {(u, v) ∈ E(R) | f(u) 6= f(v)}, there exists a bijection ξ : S → E(Q)
such that for each e(s, t) ∈ S, ξ(e) = (f(s), f(t)).
4. For each pair of edges (x, a) ∈ E(Q) and (x, b) ∈ E(Q), let U be the smallest
subtree of R that has both a and b as leaves. Then the paths from the root of
U to the roots of the subtrees f−1(a) and f−1(b) have odd length.
We call f the characteristic function of the major.
We will now construct a mapping M˜ : V (R)→ {F ,>,⊥, rand} that allows us
to embed Q in a syntax tree major R such that R computes the same function as
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Figure 4.6: An invalid syntax tree major
Algorithm 1: MarkRelevantNodes(R,Q, f)
Input : R, Q, f : V (R)→ V (Q)
Output: M : V (R)→ {∅,F}
forall T ∈ V (R) do M(T )←− ∅;
M(root(R))←− F ;
foreach leaf u of Q do
T
R←− leaf of f−1(u);
while M(T ) 6= F do
M(T )←− F ;
T ←− parent(T );
end
end
Q. This is achieved by mapping some of the leaves of R to the constant values ⊥
or >. The effect of this is that some inner nodes of R that are connected to these
leaves will map to trivial formulas like x ∧ > or x ∧ ⊥, which are equal to x or ⊥.
For an example, we refer to Figure 4.3. The remaining leaves (that are not set to
> or ⊥) are then mapped to leaves of Q such that R evaluates the same function
as Q.
Finding such a mapping can be done in a two step process. In the first step, we
will mark all inner nodes of R that are needed to encode nodes of Q with a special
symbol that we call F . For convenience, all other nodes will be marked with ∅.
Call this mapping M : V (R) → {∅,F}. As R is a syntax tree major of Q, this
marking can be found by the following iterative algorithm: For each leaf of Q, a
corresponding leaf in R is selected and the path from the root of R to this node is
marked by traversing upwards (see Algorithm 1).
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In the second step, the other inner nodes (not marked with F by Algorithm 1)
will be marked with > or ⊥, such that they do not affect the computation of the
encoded policy. Furthermore, we will mark all leaves that have no impact on the
computation with the value rand. This value shall indicate the leaf can be chosen
randomly from {⊥,>} or any randomly chosen policy that can be encoded as a
single ∧-gate in the system. This will be useful in the cryptographic construction
presented in Section 4.3. Algorithm 2 (on page 76) marks all nodes that were
marked with ∅ to ⊥, >, or rand. Call this mapping M˜ : V (R)→ {F ,>,⊥, rand}.
The algorithm marks the nodes as follows: If a node is an ∧-node marked F , all
children marked ∅ will recursively be set to >. Similarly, if a node is an ∨-node
marked F , all children marked ∅ will recursively be set to ⊥. For nodes that are
not marked F , an appropriate mapping of the children to ⊥, >, or rand is chosen,
such that the nodes do not influence the computation.
Theorem 4.1. Let R be a syntax tree major of a monotonic syntax tree Q and
let f be the characteristic function of this major, as described in Definition 4.3.
Applying the function φ : L(R)→ L(Q) ∪ {⊥,>}, defined as
φ(v) =
f(v), if M˜(v) = F ,M˜(v), otherwise
to the leaves of R yields a tree φ(R), which is semantically equal to Q, i.e., for all
configurations ψ : L(Q)→ {>,⊥}, ψ(φ(R)) = ψ(Q).
For every node q ∈ Q, let T (q) := R[f−1(q)] be the subtree of R that q is
expanded into. Consider Definition 4.3. As f is a surjection, all nodes of Q are
reached by applying f to the nodes of R. By (1), for each node q ∈ Q, f−1(q) is a
connected subtree and by (2), all expanded subtrees T (q) of nodes q are disjoint.
We will show that after applying φ to the leaves of R, each subtree of Q starting
with any q ∈ Q is semantically equivalent to the respective subtree of R rooted
at the root of T (q), i.e., they compute the same function for all configurations
ψ : L(Q) → {⊥,>}. For any node q and extended subtree T (q) we will write
q ≡ T (q) if this is the case.
We need the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.1. For the root rR of R and the root rQ of Q, it holds that f(rR) = rQ.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then f(rR) has a predecessor x and is connected to this
predecessor by an edge (x, rR). By (3) of Definition 4.3, this edge is preserved
in R, so rR also has a predecessor. This contradicts the assumption that rR is a
root.
Lemma 4.2. Let R be a syntax tree major of Q, and let Q and R be equally rooted
(i.e., both are ∧-rooted or both are ∨-rooted). Then for each node q ∈ Q, the root
of the subtree T (q) has the same (implicit) label as q.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction over the structure of the tree. Lemma
4.1 implies that the root rQ of Q has the same label as the root of T (rQ) (because
the root of T (rQ) is the root of R and both trees are equally rooted). Now let
q ∈ Q be a node for which Lemma 4.2 holds, i.e., the root of T (q) has the same
label as q. By (1) of Definition 4.3, T (q) has even height, so the leaves of T (q)
also have the same label as q. Suppose that the label of q is ∧ and let r be a child
of q in Q. Then the label of r must be ∨ (by Definition 4.1). By the induction
hypothesis, the root of T (q) is labeled ∧. Then the leaves of T (q) are also labeled
∧. Again, by (3), the edge (r, q) ∈ E(Q) is preserved in R, so there is an edge
from a leaf of T (q) to the root of T (r). This root must be labeled ∨. If the label
of q is ∨, a similar argument holds.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 4.1 by structural induction.
Proof. Let u be a leaf of Q. Algorithm 1 randomly marked a leaf v ∈ T (u) of R
with F , as well as all nodes of the single path from v to the root of T (u). Algorithm
2 configured all nodes on this path such that they return the value of their single
marked child (this means that they compute the identify function). By this, the
value of the marked leaf is propagated along the path to the root. It follows that
for all configurations ψ : L(Q)→ {⊥,>}, ψ(T (u)) = ψ(φ(v))) = ψ(f(v))) = ψ(u).
Now suppose that for all children wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ nq of a node q, wi ≡ T (wi) (where
nq is the number of children of q). We need to show that this implies that q ≡ T (q).
By (3) of Definition 4.3, the unexpanded edges of Q are preserved in R. This
means that for each edge (q, wi) ∈ E(Q) there is an edge in R that that connects
a leaf of T (q) to the root of T (wi). From Lemma 4.2 we know that the root of
T (q) and all leaves of T (q) have the same label as q. From (4) of Definition 4.3 we
conclude that marked paths meet only at nodes that have the same label as the
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Algorithm 2: SetNodeValue(T,m)
Input : Tree R with label M : V (R)→ {∅,F}, subtree T of R
(represented by its root), m ∈ {F ,⊥,>, rand}
Output: M˜ : V (R)→ {F ,⊥,>, rand}
if T is not a leaf then
M˜(T )←− m ;
if T is an ∧-node then t ←−⊥ else t ←−>;
switch m do
case F
foreach child c,M(c) = F do SetNodeValue(c, F);
foreach child c,M(c) 6= F do SetNodeValue(c, not t);
end
case t
Select a random child c;
SetNodeValue(c, t);
forall other children c do SetNodeValue(c, rand);
end
otherwise
forall children c do SetNodeValue(c, m);
end
end
end
root of T (q). All other nodes on the marked paths are set by Algorithm 2 such
that they compute the identity function, and all other nodes that are unmarked
are configured to have no influence on the computation.
If q is an ∧-gate (q computes w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wnq) then the roots of all T (wi) will
be connected by ∧-gates in T (q) and T (q) computes T (w1) ∧ T (w2) ∧ . . . ∧ T (wnq)
But we know that wi ≡ T (wi), so q ≡ T (q). Similarly, if q is an ∨-gate (q computes
w1 ∨ w2 ∨ . . . ∨ wnq) then the roots of all T (wi) will be connected by ∨-gates
in T (q) and T (q) computes T (w1) ∨ T (w2) ∨ . . . ∨ T (wnq). But we know that
wi ≡ T (wi), so q ≡ T (q).
A direct consequence of this Theorem is:
Corollary 4.1. Every syntax tree major R of a monotonic syntax tree Q semanti-
cally contains Q.
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4.3. Building the System
We now describe a CP-ABE system with hidden policies, where policies are
represented as syntax trees. It is based on [NYO09], but extended to support any
Boolean formula by utilizing syntax tree majors. The leaves of the syntax tree are
expressions of the form A = x, where A identifies an attribute and x the value
that this attribute must have. See Figure 4.2 for some examples. Our construction
supports n attributes, denoted L1, . . . , Ln. Each attribute can take on one of a
number of symbolic values. Note that this is different from the other constructions
in this thesis, were attributes are binary – a user either has a specific attribute
or not. Binary attributes can easily be emulated by allowing each attribute to
have one of two possible values, one representing that a user has the corresponding
property and one representing that he does not have it. We denote the number of
possible values of an attribute Li by ni and the symbolic values of the attribute by
vi,1, . . . , vi,ni . Thus, each leaf of the tree encodes an expression Li = vi,t. Using this
approach, we are able to support every policy that can be expressed as a Boolean
formula.
Note that we can also emulate numeric attributes using a bag of bits representa-
tion [BSW07], where each number is represented by a bit string and there are two
attributes for each bit. To use this, the policy would first be formulated in a more
abstract form, using comparisons with numbers in the leaves like A = x, A ≤ x,
or A ≥ x. These leaves would then be expanded into subtrees that evaluate the
expressions using the bit representations, as outlined in [BSW07].
4.3.1. Setup and Key Generation
Setup. An asymmetric bilinear group e : G1×G2 → GT of order p with generators
g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 is chosen. The trusted authority randomly selects random
values for ω, ω, β, β ∈ Z∗p and for each value vi,t of each attribute it also selects
a random
{
ai,t ∈ Z∗p
}
1≤t≤ni,1≤i≤n. The public key PK consists of the bilinear
group with generators g1, g2 and the values
{
Ai,t = g
ai,t
1
}
1≤t≤ni,1≤i≤n, as well as
Y = e(g1, g2)
ω, Y = e(g1, g2)
ω, B = gβ1 , and B = g
β
1 . The master key MK is
MK =
〈
ω, β, ω, β, {{ai,1}1≤t≤ni}1≤i≤n
〉
.
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Intuitively we hereby construct two parallel cryptosystems that use the same
group structure and the same secret attribute keys but differ in the values of the
secret key components ω and β. We will the denote the cryptosystem that uses ω
and β as the primary cryptosystem and the one that uses ω and β as the secondary
cryptosystem. The primary cryptosystem will be used to encrypt the actual secret
message, while the secondary one will help the decryptor to decide which nodes he
can access with his attribute set. To this end, we encrypt the fixed value 1 using
the secondary cryptosystem. The decryptor will try to decrypt this value from the
ciphertext to see if he can satisfy the policy of the gate.
KeyGen. Let L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln] = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] be the attribute list for
the user who wishes to obtain the secret key. If the user is not eligible of the
requested attributes, the trusted authority returns ⊥. Otherwise, it picks random
values s, λi ∈ Z∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and computes D0 = gβ
−1(ω−s)
2 and D0 = g
β
−1
(ω−s)
2 .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the authority also computes [Di,1, Di,2] = [gs+ai,ti λi2 , gλi2 ] where
Li = vi,ti . The secret key SKL is
〈
D0, D0, {Di,1, Di,2}1≤i≤n
〉
.
4.3.2. Encryption
After the encryptor has decided on the encryption policy and constructed a
monotonic syntax tree Q, he creates a syntax tree major R of Q which is used to
hide the actual policy Q.
Constructing a tree major. There are three ways to construct a syntax tree
major of a syntax tree Q that represents a policy: One way is to randomly expand
edges of Q into trees of even height. This will result in a random major R.
Another, more interesting approach is to “mix” Q with other trees, constructing
a common major that from an adversary’s point of view could encode all of
the input trees as well as numerous combinations of them. Ideally, we would
like combinations of trees to be as small as possible. This problem is known
as the smallest common supertree problem and is well-studied for tree majors
[RV06, Val05, RB09]. Generally, this problem is NP-hard, but by adding some
reasonable constraints on the input trees, it becomes tractable. We can adopt
the algorithm for finding the smallest common major of two trees described by
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Nishimura et al. [NRT99] to our definition of syntax tree majors. The only
constraint of Nishimura’s algorithm is that the input trees must have a bounded
degree. This is reasonable for our settings as a sufficient upper bound for all
realistic syntax trees of a particular scenario can easily be estimated.
As our notion of syntax tree majors is based on the definition of tree majors
used in [NRT99], we can modify Nishimura’s algorithm to work for our definition
of syntax tree majors. We briefly describe the necessary modifications: The most
important restriction in our definition, compared to the original one, is that nodes
of tree R can only be combined with nodes of Q that have equal labels. As the
algorithm of [NRT99] always combines the roots of Q and R, both trees must be
either ∧-rooted or ∨-rooted. If they are not equally rooted, we construct a new
node N and attach either Q or R as a subtree. The main loop of the algorithm
tries all possible combinations of nodes of Q with nodes of R. For syntax tree
majors, we must restrict these combinations to combinations that map nodes of
equal labels, i.e., the distances of the combined nodes to their respective root must
both be even or odd. Finally, the remainder of the algorithm must be restricted
such that only mappings that preserve the labels and furthermore adhere to (4)
are tried.
With this modification the algorithm can be utilized by the encryptor to system-
atically construct a tree R that is a syntax tree major of a set of trees: In addition
to the monotonic syntax tree Q, select some monotonic syntax trees P1, . . . , Pn.
Find the smallest common tree major of all Q and Pi as follows: Set Q0 := Q and
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Qi be the smallest common major of Qi−1 and Pi. The
resulting tree Qn is a syntax tree major of P1, . . . , Pn and Q and can be used to
encode any of the formulas encoded by Q, any Pi, and numerous combinations.
Figure 4.7 shows an example.
A third approach to construct suitable syntax tree majors could be to initially
decide on a large generic tree R0 that semantically contains all possible policies
that are used in a given setting. For example, an encryptor may find that all
policies that he normally uses are syntax tree minors of a 3-ary tree of height 4.
Then he could always set R to that tree and use it as a syntax tree major for all
encryptions. Using such an approach for a policy represented by a syntax tree Q,
a mapping f : V (R)→ V (Q) must be found that adheres to Definition 4.3. If Q
is indeed a minor of R, such a mapping can be found in O(|V (R)|) by a brute
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Figure 4.7: Constructing R as a comon major
force algorithm that tries to match vertices of Q to vertices of R starting from the
leaves of both trees. In this case, after initially selecting the generic tree R0, the
process of constructing a tree major is omitted for all further encryptions, and
instead the encryptor simply sets R := R0.
The result of any of these the possible approaches is a syntax tree major R and
a mapping f : V (R)→ V (Q) that characterizes the relationship between Q and R.
We will configure R such that it computes exactly the same function as Q, but
keep this configuration invisible to an attacker.
Encoding the formula. After constructing a syntax tree major R with root
T and mapping f , the encryptor randomly chooses an r ∈ Z∗p and executes
EncodeSecret(T, r) (see Algorithm 3). This algorithm encodes the secret value
r ∈ Z∗p into the tree in the following way: Beginning from the root of the tree, the
algorithm recursively traverses downwards to the leaves. If a node is an ∧-node,
the secret r is split into partial secrets, one for each child of the node (the decryptor
must satisfy all children to recover the secret), so that the sum of all partial secrets
equals r. If a node is an ∨-node, the secret is propagated to all child nodes. The
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Algorithm 3: EncodeSecret(T, r)
Input : Tree R, Subtree T of R (represented by its root), number r
Output: m : V (R)→ Z∗p
m(T )←− r;
if T is no leaf then
if T is ∧-rooted then
Let the number of child nodes be n.
ri
R←−Z∗p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
∑
i ri = r.
forall children c do EncodeSecret(c, ri)
else
forall children c do EncodeSecret(c, r)
end
end
output is a labeling m(c) of all nodes of c ∈ R to partial secrets in Z∗p. The idea
is that a decryptor needs to be able decrypt a sufficient set of partial secrets to
recover the main secret r. The encryptor then applies the Algorithms 1 and 2 of
Section 4.2 to find the mapping M˜ . After this process, each leaf v is marked with
M˜(v), a partial secret m(v), and there is a mapping f(v) that maps v to a leaf of
Q that represents an expression of the form Li = vi,t. (Note that the algorithms
mark all nodes of R, but from now on we will only need the marks of the leaves.)
The first part of the ciphertext is C˜ = MY r and C0 = B
r, which encodes the
value r and the secret message M .
The basic idea of our approach is to encrypt every leaf’s partial secret m(v)
with either the constant value represented by M˜(v) or — if M˜(v) = F — with
the attribute f(v). Wlog, assume that the last inner nodes of every path to a leaf
are ∧-gates (if such a last inner node is an ∨, replace every leaf v of that gate
with an ∧-gate having the sole child v). For each of these last inner ∧-gates v, the
encryptor computes ciphertext components CT (v) for the primary cryptosystem as
follows:
Case 1: If all children of v are either > or F , encode a genuine ∧-gate as follows:
Pick random values r
(v)
i , ∀i = 1 . . . n, such that m(v) =
∑
i r
(v)
i . For each
attribute 1 ≤ i ≤ n set C(v)i,1 = gr
(v)
i
1 and compute {C(v)i,t,2}1≤t≤ni as follows: if
the ith attribute is not found in the children of f(v) (i.e., the value is don’t
care) or the attribute value vi,t is found in the children, set C
(v)
i,t,2 = A
r
(v)
i
i,t ;
otherwise (i.e., the value vi,t is forbidden for this attribute), select C
(v)
i,t,2
randomly.
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Case 2: If one of the children is ⊥, the decryption must never succeed. In this
case, all C
(v)
i,1 and C
(v)
i,t,2 are set to random values.
Case 3: If all children are marked rand, flip a coin to decide whether to proceed
with Case 1 (encrypting with a random ∧-gate) or with Case 2.
Finally, compute the ciphertext components H(v) = Y
m(v)
and C0
(v)
= B
m(v)
. This
encrypts an additional ciphertext in the secondary cryptosystem which equals to 1.
Combining these components, the ciphertext for leaf v is
CT (v) =
〈
C0
(v)
, H(v),
{
C
(v)
i,1 ,
{
C
(v)
i,t,2,
}
1≤t≤ni
}
1≤i≤n
〉
.
The final ciphertext is
CT =
〈
C˜, C0,
{
CT (v) for all leaves v
}〉
,
along with a topological description of the tree (including the labels but excluding
any other marks).
4.3.3. Decryption
In order to decrypt, the decryptor determines which leaves his attribute set
satisfies. This is done by decrypting the second encrypted value using the second
cryptosystem with all attributes that he has and comparing the result to the value
1. If the decryptor’s attribute set does not fulfill the policy, he gets a value different
from 1. For each leaf v ∈ L(R) set C ′(v)i,2 = C(v)i,ti,2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and Li = vi,ti
and compute
M (v) =
n∏
i=1
e(C
(v)
i,1 , Di,1)
e(C ′(v)i,2 , Di,2)
and τ (v) =
H(v) ·M (v)
e(C0
(v)
, D0)
.
For each v, M (v) = e(g1, g2)
s·m(v), where s is specific to the used attribute set and
was set in the KeyGen algorithm, and τ (v) = 1 if the leaf can be satisfied by the
decryptor, and otherwise a random value. Note that if the decryptor can not
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satisfy the leaf, τ (v) might also be equal to 1. However, the probability for this
occurring is 1/p for p the order of the bilinear group, which is negligible.
Note that while the decryptor now knows which parts of the tree he satisfies,
he does not know the policies of the respective leaves since their configuration is
hidden by the construction. However, with all τ (v), he is able to decrypt as follows:
First he removes some of the leaves that he does not satisfy (i.e., where τ (v) 6= 1)
as they do not contain any information that he can use. For all τ (v) 6= 1, replace v
with the constant value ⊥ and simplify the tree by substituting subtrees with their
obvious results using the formulas A ∧ ⊥ = ⊥ and A ∨ ⊥ = A. The remaining
tree either contains only leaves that can be satisfied or is a single node ⊥. In the
latter case, return ⊥ (as the attribute set does not satisfy the policy). For each
remaining ∨-node N , randomly choose a subtree of N and substitute N with it.
(This works because Algorithm 3 encoded the same value in all subtrees of an ∨
node, so we can use any of them to retrieve it.)
Finally, collapse all remaining ∧-nodes to a single one. The message M can now
be retrieved as
M =
C˜
∏
vM
(v)
e(C0, D0)
,
where v are all remaining leaves of that single ∧-node. By multiplying a valid
combination of M (v) together, the partial secrets m(v) add up to the secret value
r which then is unblinded by the above formula.
Correctness. Using a secret key SKL that satisfies the tree, we have
C˜
∏
vM
(v)
e(C0, D0)
= M · Y
r
e(C0, D0)
∏
v
∏
i
e(C
(v)
i,1 , Di,1)
e(C ′(v)i,2 , Di,2)
= M · e(g1, g2)ωr−βrβ
−1(ω−s)+∑v(∑i(r(v)i ·(s+ai,tiλi)−(ai,tr(v)i λi))
= M · e(g1, g2)−rs+
∑
v
(∑
i r
(v)
i s
)
.
The tree is constructed such that for a leaf v that is satisfied,
∑
i r
(v)
i = m(v) and
for a sufficient subset of the leaves,
∑
vm(v) = r, so
∑
v
(∑
i r
(v)
i s
)
= rs and the
equation yields M · e(g1, g2)rs−rs = M . Note that if the equation is computed
using a key SKL that does not satisfy the tree, then some C
′(v)
i,2 will be random
values instead of g
ai,tr
(v)
i
1 . In this case, some m(v) will not be computed correctly,
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so the exponents do not cancel out and the result will be different from M (with
overwhelming probability).
4.4. Discussion
4.4.1. Anonymity of the Policy
In our construction the ciphertext is encrypted with a major of the syntax tree.
As the leaves of this tree are hidden from an adversary, he cannot decide which of
the possible policies was actually used. The anonymity set A(E,L) is determined
by the ciphertext E and the attribute set of the decryptor L = [L1, . . . , Ln]. We
will now briefly discuss the size of A(E,L). As a lower bound, assume ni = 2
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., every attribute has only two possible symbolic values. If
the decryptor can access an ∧-gate with his attribute set L, he can conclude that
each ith attribute encoded in the policy of the ∧-gate is either set to the value
Li that he owns or is a “don’t care”. Similarly, if he cannot decrypt an ∧-gate,
he can conclude that there is at least one attribute i in the policy of the ∧-gate
that is different from his attribute value Li. In both cases the number of possible
∧-gates is O(2n). For a tree R with leaves L(R), the number of possible policies is
in O(2n·|L(R)|).
In some scenarios, it might suffice if the attacker knows only the general form
of the policy, i.e., he wants to know which nodes of the tree belong to the actual
policy and which ones are dummy gates introduced in order to obfuscate the policy.
In our construction, the form of the policy is determined by the leaves. Some of
these are set to a constant value (> or ⊥) to render unused inner nodes inoperative,
some are genuine ∧-gates encoding parts of the policy. Thus, to find out which
form the original policy has, an attacker must know which ∧-gates are constant
values and which ones are not, which for a tree R with leaves L(R) gives O(2|L(R)|)
combinations. However, for reasons of symmetry, some of these forms may be
topologically identical, so the number of forms might be smaller than that. More
concrete, the most symmetries are found in a complete n-ary tree. However, in
[Mat70] it is shown that even in such a tree, the number of subtrees is exponential
in the number of nodes, so it is at least exponential in the number of leaves. Thus,
even taking into account symmetries, the number of possible forms of a policy
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encoded in a syntax tree major is exponential in the number of leaves.
4.4.2. Security and Policy Anonymity
CPA-Security. As the system uses the same structures as Nishide’s construction,
its CPA-security can directly be derived from it. We can model the security using
a standard security game similar to the ones we used in Sections 2.4.1 and 3.3.2,
modified to take into account the properties of our construction. As we only claim
security in the generic group model, the more powerful non-selective version of the
models can be used:
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to
the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
lists of attributes L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln] = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ].
Challenge. The adversary declares two messages M0 and M1 and a policy W .
The policy must not be satisfied by any of the queried attribute lists. The
challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts Mb under W , producing
CT . It gives CT to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
lists of attributes L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln] = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] with the added
restriction that none of these lists must satisfy W .
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ for b. The advantage for the adversary
in this game is defined to be Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
.
The CP-ABE system is said to be secure if all polynomial time adversaries have
at most negligible advantage in this security game.
Theorem 4.2. The construction given in Section 4.3 is secure in the generic group
model.
Proof. Similar to our proof of DABE in Section 3.4.2, we show how any adversary
who plays the CP-ABE game (denoted Adv1) can be used to construct an adversary
in a slightly modified game (Adv2). Then we prove that no such Adv2 can exists,
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so no Adv1 can exist, either. We define the modified game in the following manner:
The phases Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2 are equal to the CP-ABE game. In
the Challenge phase, the adversary declares a policy W . The policy must not be
satisfied by any of the queried attribute lists. The challenger flips a random coin
b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts Mb under W , producing CT , but instead of computing C˜
as described in the algorithm, he computes C˜ as
C˜ =
Y r, if b = 1e(g1, g2)θ, if b = 0,
where θ is chosen randomly from Z∗p. The task of Adv1 is to distinguish the two
group elements Y r = e(g1, g2)
ωr and e(g1, g2)
θ.
Lemma 4.3. If there exists an adversary Adv1 who has advantage of  to win the
original CP-ABE game, then there exists an adversary Adv2 who wins the modfied
game with advantage /2.
Proof. Given an adversary Adv1 that has advantage  in the CP-ABE game, we
can construct an adversary Adv2 as follows: Adv2 simulates Adv1. In the phases
Setup, Phase 1, and Phase 2, Adv2 forwards all messages he receives from Adv1
to the challenger, and all messages from the challenger to Adv1. In the Challenge
phase, Adv2 receives to messages M0 and M1 from Adv1 and the challenge CT
(which contains C˜ that is either e(g1, g2)
ωr or e(g1, g2)
θ for a random θ) from the
challenger. He flips a coin b and multiplies C˜ by Mb and sends the resulting
ciphertext CT ′ to Adv1. When Adv1 outputs a guess b′, Adv2 outputs 1 if b′ = b
and 0 if b′ 6= b. If for the original C˜ = e(g1, g2)ω, then Adv2’s challenge given to
Adv1 is a well-formed CP-ABE ciphertext and Adv1 has advantage  of guessing
the correct b′ = b. Otherwise, the challenge is independent of the message M0 and
M1, so the advantage of Adv2 is 0. Thus, we have
Pr[Adv2 succeeds] = Pr[C˜ = Y
r] Pr[β′ = β | C˜ = Y r]+
Pr[C˜ = e(g1, g2)
θ] Pr[β′ 6= β | C˜ = e(g1, g2)θ]
≤ 1
2
(
1
2
+ ) +
1
2
· 1
2
=
1 + 
2
.
86
4.4. Discussion
To prove Theorem 4.2, we use the asymmetric case of the Generic Diffie-Hellman
Exponent problem as introduced in Section 2.4.2. We need to show that the adver-
sary’s target term f = ωr is independent of (P,Q,R) according to Definition 2.5,
where (P,Q,R) are the polynomials from G1, G2 and GT that he knows. If this is
the case, the security follows from Theorem 2.2. After the challenge phase, the
adversary has the following terms:
• The public system key PK: {ai,t ∈ Z∗p}1≤t≤ni,1≤i≤n , β, β ∈ P . ω, ω ∈ R,
• Private keys SKL for several queries L. Let the number of these sets be N
and denode the jth query L(j). For each query 1 ≤ j ≤ N , the challenger
created a secret value s(j) and random values λ
(j)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n (n being the
number of attributes): β−1(ω − s(j)), β−1(ω − s(j)), s(j) + ai,tiλ(j)i , λ(j)i ∈ Q.
No L(j) satisfies the policy per the definition of the security game.
• The ciphertext components
– C0: βr ∈ P for a randomly chosen r.
– For all leaves that contain genuine ∧-gates and are satisfied for an L(j)
C
(v)
i,1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n and C(v)i,t,2, 1 ≤ t ≤ ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n: r(v)i , ai,tr(v)i ∈ P .
– For all leaves the unblinding values of the secondary cryptosystem H(v)
and C0
(v)
: ωm(v) ∈ R, βm(v) ∈ P .
From this examination we follow that the polynomial vectors P , Q, and R are as
follows:
P =

1, β, β, βr,{
ai,t ∈ Z∗p
}
1≤t≤ni,1≤i≤n ,
{r(v)i , ai,tr(v)i }∀v,1≤t≤ni,1≤i≤n,
{βm(v)}∀v
 ,
Q =

1,
{β−1(ω − s(j))}1≤j≤N ,
{β−1(ω − s(j))}1≤j≤N ,
{s(j) + ai,tiλ(j)i , λ(j)i }L(j)i =vi,ti ,1≤j≤N,1≤i≤n
 , R =
(
1, ω, ω,
{ωm(v)}∀v
)
,
and f = ωr.
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βr r
(v)
i a
(v)
i,t r
(j)
i
β−1(ω − s(j)) ωr − s(j)r β−1r(v)i (ω − s(j)) β−1a(v)i,t r(v)i ω − β−1a(v)i,t r(v)i s(j))
β
−1
(ω − s(j)) β−1βr(ω − s(j)) β−1r(v)i (ω − s(j)) β
−1
r(ω − s(j))a(v)i,t
s(j) + ai,tiλ
(j)
i βr(s
(j) + ai,tiλ
(j)
i ) r
(v)
i s
(j) + ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i r
(v)
i (ai,tis
(j) + a2i,tiλ
(j)
i )
Table 4.1: Pairing a term containing r with a term containing s(j)
The adversary needs to build the target polynomial ωr from P,Q,R using only
the combinations implied by Definition 2.5. The product ωr is not contained in
any term, so he needs to multiply a polynomial of Q with a polynomial of P or
Q such that both factors ω and r are contained in either term. First observe
which terms contain ω. There is only ω ∈ R which cannot be multiplied with
any other polynomial as it is in R and β−1(ω − s(j)) ∈ Q for any 1 ≤ j ≤ N . As
this has β−1 as additional factor, the adversary must eliminate β−1 from any of
these polynomials by multiplying it with a polynomial from P or Q that contains
β. There are two possibilities to achieve this: Multiplying with β ∈ P yields
(ω − s(j)) ∈ R, and multiplying with βr ∈ P yields (ωr − rs(j)) ∈ R. These are
the only two methods to create a polynomial that contains ω, but not β−1. We
now examine which of these two combinations can be used to build the target
polynomial ωr.
Case 1: (ω − s(j)) ∈ R. Since the adversary has to build ωr, he is required to
have r as another factor. However, only terms of P and Q can be multiplied, and
the current polynomial is already in R, so there is no way to build ωr.
Case 2: (ωr − rs(j)) ∈ R for some (any) 1 ≤ j ≤ N , which contains ωr. Note
that this is an element of R and no other multiplication is possible. It follows that
this is the only way to create the product ωr. The adversary now has to build
rs(j) in order to remove that term from the polynomial.
To construct a polynomial that contains rs(j), the adversary now needs to
multiply a polynomial that contains s(j) with a polynomial that contains r or at
least r
(v)
i (as r can be constructed using a sum over some r
(v)
i ). Table 4.1 lists all
results.
The only useful term is r
(v)
i s
(j) + ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i . As explained in the correctness
proof, summing up all attribute keys for an appropriate set of leaves, the sum
becomes equal to rs(j) +
∑
v
∑
i ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i , and adding that to our current term,
we get
88
4.4. Discussion
(
ωr − rs(j))+(rs(j) +∑
v
∑
i
ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i
)
= ωr +
∑
v
∑
i
ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i .
The adversary can then cancel out
∑
v
∑
i ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i by multiplying the ciphertext
components a
(v)
i,t r
(j)
i with his secret key components λ
(j)
i .
However, note that none of the adversary’s keyrings satisfies the access policy.
This means that for each j there is at least one v, for which he does not have
a sufficient set s(j) + ai,tiλ
(j)
i to build the partial secret m
(v). If he uses such a
wrong attribute set, he will not be able to cancel out the term
∑
v
∑
i ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i ,
as the corresponding ciphertext components are not a
(v)
i,t r
(j)
i ∈ P but were set by
the encryptor to random values. Without a sufficient set of partial secrets, he
cannot build r and thus not rs(j) +
∑
v
∑
i ai,tiλ
(j)
i r
(v)
i for any j.
As this is the only remaining possibility to remove the unneeded term rs(j) from
the polynomial, it can now be seen that f = ωr is independent of (P,Q,R), and
from Theorem 2.2 it follows that the adversary cannot build f and thus cannot
break the system.
Anonymity. We also need to show that an attacker cannot distinguish encryptions
performed by two policies that are in the same anonymity set. As shown in
Section 4.4.1, from an adversary’s view the anonymity set is defined by the tree
major and the set of nodes that he can decrypt. The latter set is in turn defined
by his attribute set.
To formally define anonymity, we utilize a game as follows: The adversary
decides on two policies W0 and W1 as well as a common syntax tree major R
of both W0 and W1. Note that there is only a fixed number of ways that each
policy can be embedded in R, as the process is defined by our algorithms given in
Section 4.2. Given an attribute list and a syntax tree major R, an adversary can
determine if exactly one of W0 and W1 is an element of the anonymity set. This
can only be the case if one of the leaves of R can be decrypted for one of the two
policies W0 and W1 and cannot be decrypted for the other one. If this is the case
for any of the leaves, the attacker can determine which of the policies was used,
and the anonymity is broken. This also means that the anonymity set for this list
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of attributes does not contain both W0 and W1, but only one of them. However,
as we only claim policy anonymity for the case that either both or neither of W0
and W1 are in the anonymity set, we restrict the adversary to only query attribute
lists where the adversary is not able to make such a distinction.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to
the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary commits to the challenge ciphertext policies W0,W1 as
well as a common syntax tree major R of W0 and W1 and a message M . The
challenger flips a random coin b and passes the ciphertext E := Encrypt(PK,
M , Wb) to the adversary.
Query: The adversary sends a number of attribute list Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ n for any
polynomial n. For each attribute list Li, the challenger verifies that either
both W0 and W1 are in the anonymity set derived from Li or that neither
W0 or W1 are in that anonymity set. If this is the case, the challenger gives
the adversary the secret key SKLi . Note that these queries can be adaptive.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The adversary wins the game if his advantage
∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
∣∣ is negligible.
Theorem 4.3. If Nishide’s construction is secure, the adversary cannot win the
game.
Proof sketch As the leaves of the tree are encrypted using Nishide’s construction
(without the unblinding step), the adversary’s views are identical for both b = 0
and b = 1. This is the case because by our restriction each leaf that can be
decrypted if b = 0 can also be decrypted if b = 1 and each leaf that cannot be
decrypted if b = 0 can also not be decrypted if b = 1. Thus he cannot distinguish
between the two policies.
4.4.3. Reducing the Size of the Ciphertext
For each leaf’s encryption every attribute of the system is used. This is the only
way to maximize the anonymity set, because when some attribute A is not used
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for the decryption of a leaf v, then the decryptor can obviously conclude that
the partial policy of v does not contain A. However, if the universe of attributes
of a given system is very large, it might be feasible to use only a subset of all
attributes for the encryption of each leaf while still using enough attributes to
get a sufficiently large anonymity set. Similarly to [NYO09], each leaf v may be
encrypted with its own set of attributes Av. Av can be a random superset of
the set attributes actually used in the leaf. However, in order to hide as much
of the semantics of each partial policy, some care must be taken, as it should
be understood which information an attacker gains by the knowledge of Av. It
must also be considered that Av must be sent along with each leaf, which slightly
increases the size of the ciphertext.
As a more systematic approach, the universe of attributes could be partitioned
into different domains Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ nD with nD the number of domains. For
example one domain D1 could contain all user-specific attributes, D2 could contain
all device-specific attributes, D3 all location-specific attributes, etc. If each domain
Di consists of |Di| attributes, then the anonymity set of a respective leaf Av with
Av = Di is O(2|Di|). With this approach, an adversary knows that a leaf v with
Av = D1 might encode a partial policy over some user-specific properties (or as
always an encoding of ⊥ or >), but he does not know which one or which ones.
This gives the encryptor precise control over what information is disclosed with an
encrypted leaf. Moreover, instead of listing each element of Av, with this approach
only the index i of Di needs to be sent along with the partial ciphertext of v, CT (v).
4.5. Conclusion
We introduced the notion of policy anonymity in cryptographic access control. To
this end, we proposed the idea to obfuscate the policy used in an encryption by
constructing a syntax tree major of the syntax tree that encodes the desired policy.
The leaves are then hidden from an adversary using a cryptographic primitive.
We discussed how these majors can be characterized and how the leaves need to
be configured to encode a specific, given policy in one of its majors. The majors
can be chosen arbitrarily large, and the larger a major is the larger becomes the
anonymity set. From the anonymity set, an adversary gains only very general
informations about the encoded policy; for example he knows an upper bound
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of its complexity and that some of his attribute sets satisfy certain parts of the
major. We then used these primitives to modify a CP-ABE scheme with partially
hidden policies to support every policy that can be expressed as a Boolean formula
and enable an encryptor to obfuscate that policy.
Our construction compares favorably to [NYO09], as it is able to efficiently
encode any policy that can be expressed as a Boolean formula and is not limited to
policies with small DNF represenations, and to the various Predicate Encryption
schemes. However, it may be possible to construct a scheme that hides even
more properties of the encoded policy by using a different encoding of the it, like
garbled circuits which presently have been utilized to solve different problems
[FLA06, SS10]. We leave this as future work. Also, our approach may be applicable
to other CP-ABE system that like Nishide’s support only ∧-conjunctions.
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Chapter5
Cryptographic Enforcement of DRM
Licenses
5.1. Introduction
Digital Rights Management (DRM), as its variants Enterprise Rights Management
(ERM) and Information Rights Management (IRM) [Tho09], provide mechanisms
for fine-grained access and usage control for documents. To this end, documents are
encrypted, and decryption is controlled by a DRM viewer that runs on the clients’
system. This viewer enforces the access rules associated with each document. The
basic idea of enforcing policies on the client side using encrypted documents is
very similar to Attribute-Based Encryption, so we will now take a close look at
Digital Rights Management (DRM), as it seems to be an especially interesting
application scenario for cryptographic access control.
In DRM, usage rules of a document are represented in the form of a license, a
digital object that contains both the usage policy and a decryption key. A user
needs to undertake two steps in order to use content protected with DRM: First he
must obtain a license, then he downloads the content itself which is encrypted by
the content provider and can be decrypted with the decryption key specified in the
usage license. These two data objects may be acquired independently from two
different parties. There are a number of different DRM standards that describe
different architectures.
For simplicity, in this chapter we examine only the Open Mobile Alliance DRM
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Figure 5.1: OMA architecture (simplified)
architecture (OMA DRM) [Mot07, All08]. In OMA DRM, a protected content
object is called a media object. It is offered for download by a content issuer. The
usage license is contained in a rights object (RO) which is purchased from a rights
issuer. This license contains usage rules and a key that is personalized for the
device that is (by the rules of the license) allowed to render the content. The
license may also differ depending on the payment model (i.e., what usage rights
the user has payed for specifically) and other aspects that are up to the rights
issuer. Figure 5.1 visualizes this concept.
An advantage of such an architecture is that the content can be stored on
untrusted devices and distributed without restrictions because it is encrypted and
cannot be used without obtaining a rights object. As the content is often very
large (e.g., video and audio data), this is an especially useful property because
cheap, insecure data storage can be used for the content and a trusted party is
only needed to distribute the small rights objects.
From a more abstract point of view, we can consider that the owner of a content
has specified a policy made up of rules for every possible usage scenario for the
content (publishing license). The issuing process of the license done by the rights
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issuer can be seen as an enforcement of some parts of that policy (for example
parts describing who is eligible to purchase what kind of licenses), while other
parts that are only applicable to specific usages and specify restrictions that apply
to a specific user extracted into the license. The task of the player (DRM agent)
is to enforce such remaining parts. Our approach is to embed the publishing
license directly into the ciphertext using Attribute-Based Encryption. This way,
the first enforcement process is done implicitly by cryptographic means, and the
personalization of the license is no longer necessary. Another advantage of this
approach is that the rights issuer does not have to be queried (or contacted at all)
on each transaction in the process of obtaining a usage license. This reduces the
number of network transmissions and lowers the demands on the rights issuer’s
servers (especially in regard to reachability).
In this approach, a rights object that is purchased from a right issuer contains a
policy over attributes that was created using public attribute keys. Each user has
secret attribute keys representing information about the devices he owns and other
properties that may be interesting for a DRM provider. Using these attribute keys,
the user can decrypt the media object if his attributes satisfy the policy.
However, in practice not all parts of such a DRM policy can be represented by
static attributes. For example, a rights issuer may allow customers to purchase
rights to play a particular video on a certain device at most 3 times. While it is
easy to grant the user an attribute key that allows him to access the video on a
device, it is not obvious how he can be forced to give up this ability if there is no
way for the rights issuer to revoke the respective attribute. Generally, revocation of
attribute keys is an open problem of all ABE constructions and – more generally –
of all variants of cryptographic access control. We will discuss this issue later in
Section 6.2.2.
Using ABE for such a scenario leads to a new architecture for DRM systems that
enforces parts of the policies cryptographically, while at the same time reduces the
trust required in DRM viewers. To do this, we partition the set of rules into static
and dynamic rules. Static rules are enforced by cryptographic means before an
access to the media takes place, while dynamic rules are enforced at runtime by a
trusted DRM viewer. To give an intuition of this idea, consider a typical license of
a DRM protected system where a media can only be accessed by a certain type
of device. This is an example of a static rule: It must checked before any kind of
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access to the media, no matter what specific usage (e.g., playing or copying) is
desired. To statically enforce this rule, we can encrypt the media with a key that is
only given to valid devices. In fact, simple static rules like this are already in use:
In most DRM systems, each media is encrypted with a title key KT , which is sent
encrypted along the license and can only be decrypted by using a private player
key KP that is known only to authenticated DRM viewers (and the rights issuer).
This construction can be seen as a static rule stipulating that access must only be
granted to an authenticated DRM viewer. If one manages to restrict usage of KP
to authorized viewers, trust relies upon the issuer of the key KP , who – unlike the
viewing platform – can be controlled by the media distributor. This observation is
crucial to our approach.
Opposed to traditional DRM architectures, DRM content in our framework is
not directly encrypted by a single title key, but with an arbitrary Boolean formula
over a set of keys. In the most general case, these keys may even be maintained by
different, independent authorities. A DRM viewer has to retrieve the relevant keys
from the respective authorities in order to decrypt the media. Each of these keys is
associated with a certain property of the user or the platform that is executing the
viewer and is only granted to the viewer if certain conditions and/or obligations
(that are part of the license) are fulfilled.
ODRL Expression
Attribute Policy Modiﬁed ODRL Expression
Figure 5.2: Extraction of static rules
More formally, let m be a media and KP the player specific key that is needed
to access the media. We denote the title key that is needed to access m by
KT . In traditional DRM schemes, the encrypted media is distributed along with
E(KP , KT ). Generalizing this approach, we can use cryptography to enforce
properties statically. For example, let KD be another key that is only granted by a
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key-issuer after a certain date has passed. Using this approach, we can additionally
encrypt the media with KD to enforce that the media can only be accessed by an
authorized viewer and after the given date:
E(KD, E(KP , KT )) .
We can further generalize this idea so that any Boolean formula can be used to
represent conditions that have to be met before decryption. To achieve this, we
use the notion of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) as introduced in Section 2.2
and discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis. In our example, where both
KD and KP are required to decrypt KT , the encryption policy could be written as
p(K) := KD ∧KP , where KD, KP ∈ K. The title key would then be encrypted as
E(p(K), KT ) .
In order to decrypt, a user has to acquire a set of attributes such that he is able to
satisfy p(K). We call the set of obligations that are enforced by such a predicate
static rules.
Static rules add an additional layer to the dynamic DRM enforcement framework
supplementing the enforcement of the dynamic rules with cryptographic primitives.
Figure 5.3 visualizes this relationship. Even if an attacker is able to overcome the
enforcement of the dynamic rules, there are static rules that must be fulfilled before
he is able to access the media. However, the player lacks cryptographic keys for
this step. This is favourable as it allows a reduction of trust in the viewers: While
classic DRM schemes are completely broken if an attacker manages to extract a
secret player key, our scheme at least ensures that – even in case of a compromised
viewer – some parts of the license, i.e., the static rules, are always enforced, since
crucial keys are not available to the attacker. Furthermore, using cryptography
to enforce static rules can replace the license personalization process, as outlined
before, as the publisher license itself can be used directly instead.
It is, however, not very practical to require two policies (one containing the static
rules and one containing the dynamic rules), and in fact, the distinction between
static and dynamic rules might not be clear to license authors. Thus, we propose a
license conversion tool as a central component of our framework. This conversion
tool takes as input a DRM license and gives as output the static enforceable sub-
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Figure 5.3: Structure of DRM rules
policy, containing only static rules which are suitable for use with a cryptographic
algorithm (called attribute policy), and a modified DRM license that contains the
remainder of the rules. The attribute policy is enforced through a cryptographic
construction, while the remainder of the policy (i.e., the dynamic rules) needs to
be enforced at runtime by the DRM viewer. This strategy effectively allows to
reduce the trust in the viewer, as some important rules like group membership,
payed fees, or a temporal usage range can be enforced cryptographically even on
compromised DRM viewers.
Outline. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: We describe a DRM
framework that utilizes DABE in Section 5.2. To illustrate the practicability of
our framework, we describe a conversion process for DRM licenses in a scenario
where ODRL policies are used in Section 5.3. We describe an implementation of
this conversion process in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2. Framework
We propose the DRM framework as depicted in Figure 5.4. As usual, the media
distributor formulates a license that he attaches to the media. This license
includes both dynamic rules and static rules. In fact, from the point-of-view of
the distributor there may not be any obvious differences between the two types
of rules. Subsequently, he runs a conversion tool that takes as input the license
and a set of conversion rules. The tool analyses the policy to find the components
that contain static rules, and extracts an attribute policy A (i.e., a sub-policy
containing only the static rules) from the license. This attribute policy A contains
all cryptographically enforceable parts of the license and is used in the DABE
encryption step. The media distributor furthermore obtains public attribute keys
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Figure 5.4: Involved parties, relationships, and data structures
for all attributes referenced in A from the attribute authorities. In a multi-authority
scenario he might have a choice between different, independent authorities, and the
media distributor can modify the conversion rules used for extracting static rules
from ODRL policies to constitute his decision of the authorities he trusts most.
This allows for much greater flexibility. For example, the distributor may entrust
different parties with the control of different aspects of a policy, or he may even
give the decryptor alternatives that allow him to request some attributes from one
a set of different authorities in case one of them is unreachable or the decryptor
does not trust it. However, it must be clear from the names of the attributes in
the attribute policy which attribute authority was chosen, so that the users can
request secret attribute keys from the same authorities.
The media is then encrypted using a title key, which is in turn encrypted with
the Encrypt algorithm of the DABE scheme. Thus, only users with secret attribute
key rings that satisfy the attribute policy A can decrypt the title key and the
media. The media is distributed along with the encrypted title key, the attribute
policy A and the modified ODRL expression.
Whenever a user downloads protected content, he inspects the attribute policy
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and obtains a set of secret attribute keys that fulfill the policy, unless he is already
in possession of the required keys. He is able to access the title key by executing
the Decrypt algorithm, which in turn can be used to access the media.
Not shown in Figure 5.4 is the central authority that initializes the global system
parameters (algorithm Setup) and grants every user u a key pair (PK u, SK u) that
is used by the attribute authorities to personalize the secret attribute keys. The
global system parameters and public user keys created by this trusted authority
are made available securely to all participants.
The task of the attribute authorities is the provision of attribute keys. At
creation, each authority executes CreateAuthority, taking as input the global
system parameters. Whenever queried for public attribute keys – usually by media
distributors – the authority executes RequestAttributePK. All attribute keys are
identified by strings, and each attribute authority is able to maintain an arbitrary
number of attributes. Users may query the authorities for secret attribute keys.
When this happens, the queried attribute authority has to verify if the user is
eligible of the attribute, and if so, execute RequestAttributeSK, giving as input
the public user key. Depending on the implementation and the semantics of the
attributes, a user may have to perform some actions (e.g. make a payment) before
he becomes eligible for some of the keys. Note that this incremental claim of
attributes is not supported by most conventional CP-ABE constructions, as there
is usually a single KeyGen operation that gives a user all of his attribute keys at
once. DABE, however, is specifically designed to support settings where users may
request new attribute keys at any time.
Also note that the attribute policy limits general access to the media by enforcing
certain prerequisites for decryption, but it cannot control how the media is used
once the attribute policy is fulfilled. Thus, only those rules are enforceable that
specify conditions that must be fulfilled by the viewers before access is granted for
the first time. Static rules are thus a subset of all rules of a policy. Dynamic rules
must still be enforced at runtime by the DRM viewer.
5.3. Processing ODRL Expressions
To illustrate the practicability of our framework, we consider a DRM scenario in
which the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [Ini02] is used to express licenses.
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An ODRL expression allows to describe a set of actions a user is allowed to perform
and a set of rules associated with each action. The rules describe properties
that the user or the executing device has to fulfil before the associated actions
can be taken. They are classified into constraints, requirements, and conditions.
Constraints are limits to exercising the actions, requirements are obligations that
must be fulfilled in order to be allowed to perform the action, and conditions specify
exceptions that, if they become true, expire the permissions. We will subsume
ODRL constraints and requirements as rules and further partition them into static
rules and dynamic rules. For example, static rules could mandate that an action
can only be performed by members of a certain group, on certain hardware, after
a certain time has passed, or that the user must pay some fee before taking the
action.
5.3.1. Content Protection
In detail, the encryption process, executed by media distributors, contains the
following phases (see also Figure 5.5 for a visualization of the process):
1. XML Extraction. This phase takes as input an ODRL expression Pol and
a set of conversion rules that map cryptographically enforceable ODRL rules
within Pol to a single attribute policy. It outputs a Boolean expression in the
form of a circuit containing a predicate p(K) that describes the enforceable
sub-policy of Pol. It also outputs a modified ODRL expression Pol′. In Pol′,
all static attribute nodes are marked with a special XML attribute, so that
the DRM viewer knows that they do not need to be enforced at runtime.
2. Attribute Expansion. The Boolean expression created by the XML extrac-
tion phase may contain numerical and date/time attributes and numerical
comparisons. As ABE constructions usually support only Boolean attributes
and comparisons, these numerical attributes need to be suitably encoded,
see Section 5.3.4. The result of the first two steps is a logical expression that
can be represented as a syntax tree.
3. Policy Finalization. The final steps are dependent on the DABE con-
struction that is used. The tree obtained in the last phase is optimized
(e.g. by combining adjacent AND/OR nodes) and converted to the required
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Figure 5.5: ODRL expression conversion process
access structure format (i.e., DNF [KTS07, CN07, MKE08], access trees
[BSW07, BKP09, GJPS08, LCLX09], or share-generating matrices of linear
secret-sharing schemes [Wat11]). Call the result A.
4. Encryption. The media distributor retrieves public keys for all attributes
used in A from the respective attribute authorities. The distributor executes
the algorithm Encrypt(PK , KT ,A,PKA1 , . . . ,PKAN ) with the random title
key KT and the public attribute keys as input and receives as output a
ciphertext CT . Subsequently, he encrypts the plaintext media m with the
title key KT and publishes the encrypted media together with KT , the license
and access policy:
〈E(KT ,m),CT ,A, Pol′〉 .
In our implementation we decided to also include statically enforced rules in the
modified license, but mark them with a special XML tag. This gives the DRM
viewer additional information about what is already enforced by the cryptographic
components, (i.e., what attributes the decryptor is proven to have) so that the
entire license is accessible by the user.
5.3.2. Parsing Agreements
An ODRL expression consists of offers and agreements; agreements are used as
DRM licenses and are thus the only components that have to be enforced at
runtime. Agreements are XML blocks enclosed in <agreement> . . . </agreement>
tags. An agreement consists of a set of permissions, where a set of rules can be
associated with each permission. Figure 5.6 shows an example permission that
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<permission>
<print>
<requirement>
<prepay>
<payment>
<amount currency="USD">20</amount>
</payment>
</prepay>
</requirement>
</print>
</permission>
Figure 5.6: Sample permission with rule
allows printing of a document once an amount US$ 20 has been payed in advance.
This rule is an example of a static rule, as an attribute rule
media1234.hasPayedFor.USD >= 20
can be added to the attribute policy A, where 1234 is the identifier of the media.
For permissions with multiple rules, all rules must be honored, so the enforable
rules in the attribute policy must be combined with the AND operator.
ODRL supports the declaration of various permissions inside a single permissions
block, corresponding to different rule sets associated with different actions that
can be performed alternatively. We can not control the type of action that a user
performs once the decryption has taken place, but obviously he has to fulfil at
least one rule set to be able to decrypt. Thus we allow decryption of the title key
if any of the rule sets is satisfied (all other parts of the license must be enforced
at runtime). To achieve this, the rule sets of different permissions are connected
by an OR operator to produce the policy A. Formally, given a set of permissions
Pi, where each permission contains enforceable rules Ri,j, the generated attribute
policy has the form
∨
i
∧
j
Ri,j.
Note, however, that some Ri,j could themselves become Boolean expressions after
the Attribute Expansion phase (see Section 5.3.4), so the final access policy might
not yet be in DNF.
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constraint/group/context/uid/(\w+)
=> user.groupname.uid{str[0]}
requirement/prepay/payment/amount\[@currency=
"(\w+\?)"\]/(\d+)
=> media{id}.hasPayedFor.{str[0]} >=
{int[1]}}
constraint/spatial/constraint/datetime/
start/\(\d\d\d\d-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\d)
=> datepassed.{year[0]}.{month[0]}.{day[0]} OR
datepassed.numerical >= {numericaldate[0]}
Figure 5.7: Sample Conversion rules
5.3.3. Path Conversion
We automate the extraction of rules from ODRL permissions by conversion rules
that map an ODRL rule to an attribute.
Consider, for example, the rule shown in Figure 5.6. The ODRL rule can
be written in its XPath form as permission/print/requirement/prepay/pay-
ment/amount[@currency="USD"]/20. To find all rules of this form within an
ODRL expression, we can use a regular expression: requirement/prepay/pay-
ment/amount[@currency="(.+)"]/(.+). This expression will match all ODRL
rules of the type prepay, and output two match groups : One that represents the
currency as a string (“USD” in our example), and one that represents the amount
(20 in our example). We can subsequently use these match groups to automatically
create the above rule in the attribute policy.
Our conversion tool takes as input a set of conversion rules that define mappings
of XPath-like regular expressions to attribute names. Figure 5.7 shows two example
conversion rules as understood by our framework. Each rule conists of two parts,
separated by the character sequence =>. The first part of each rule is a regular
expression over an XPath, describing a node in a permission subtree. The second
part of each rule describes the destination attribute for any rule matching the
regular expression. This destination attribute can contain patterns enclosed in {}
brackets that will be replaced by values of the match groups. Table 5.1 summarizes
these patterns. Note that we are using Perl regular expressions, which offer some
additional features over conventional regular expressions. For example, in a Perl
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Pattern Replaced by
id Media ID
uid UID of current context block
str[i] String representation of ith group
int[i] Integer representation of ith group
year[i] Year component of ith group
month[i] Month component of ith group
day[i] Day component of ith group
numericaldate[i] Numeric date representation of ith group
Table 5.1: Substituting match groups in destination attributes
regular expression, the substring \d can be used to represent a single decimal digit.
In a conventional regular expression, this would have been written as [0-9].
For example, the first rule of Figure 5.7 maps an ODRL element of type group,
described further by a context field UID, to an attribute that represents the viewer’s
desired group membership. The term {str[0]} of the second part of the rule will
be replaced by the string representation of the first match group, which is matched
by the term (\w+) of the regular expression. Consider again the ODRL expression
from Figure 5.6. The XML subtree inside permission/modify matches the second
conversion rule of Figure 5.7.
5.3.4. Representing ODRL Rules by Attributes
In this section we show how enforceable ODRL rules, as encoded by the extraction
process described above, are represented as attributes. Enforceable attributes deal
with properties of the user who tries to access the media, as his identity, affiliation,
age, role, and group membership. Alternatively they could be connected to the
document itself, like payments made for purchase. Table 5.2 lists all ODRL rules
that can be expressed as static rules.
In our sample implementation we use a systematic naming scheme where attribute
names incorporate URLs of attribute authorities, components describing ODRL
context blocks, and unique identifiers.
The names also support attributes that can represent integers. For many
scenarios it might be enough to use Boolean attributes to represent numerical
values. For example, if a license requires the payment of US$ 20, inclusion of an
attribute media{id}.hayPayedFor.USD20 is enough to enforce the rule. However,
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ODRL Name Attribute
Individual user.<context>
Group user.groupmember.<context>
CPU device.cpu.<context>
Network device.network.<context>
device.network.ip
Screen device.screen.<context>
Storage device.storage.<context>
Memory device.memory.<context>
Printer device.printer.<context>
Hardware device.hardware.<context>
Software device.software.<context>
Date Time datepassed.<year>
datepassed.<year> -<month>
datepassed.<year> -<month> -<day>
datepassed.numerical
Prepay media<id>.hasPayedFor.<currency>
Accept media<id>.accepted
Register media<id>.registered
Table 5.2: Static rules of the ODRL standard with standardized attribute mappings
ODRL allows very flexible rules that may, for example, restrict the number of
pages that a user can read depending on the concrete amount of money that he
has payed. Thus, the attributes should be represented in a way to allow numerical
comparisons within the attribute policy A. We thus encode integers as “bags
of bits”, as described in [BSW07]: In a bag of bits representation a number is
represented as a binary string of fixed length. For each of these bits there exist
two attributes. One of these represents a binary 1 in the respective position, one
represents a 0. The syntax that we use is
attributeName [bitPosition ].bitValue ,
where bitPosition is the index of the bit in the bit string and bitValue is either 1 or
0, depending on the value of the respective bit. For example, if someone possesses
a secret key for the attribute x[2].0, then the binary representation of his integer
attribute x has a binary 0 at position 2. If x has a bit length of 3, a complete set
of attributes for x could be, for example,
x[2].0, x[1].1, x[0].1,
meaning that the attribute x has the value 0112 = 310 for the respective user. To
encode an ODRL expression that represents a numerical comparison, for example,
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the expression x ≥ 3, we can use a Boolean expression over these bit attributes:
x[2].1 OR (x[1].1 AND x[0].1) .
To fulfill this expression, a decryptor could either have the bit number 2 set (then
x would be at least 4), or both bits 1 and 0 (then x would be 3).
Attributes that deal with date or time can be encoded in various ways. There
could be Boolean attributes that are only issued after some point in time has
passed (this approach is similar to using a key KD as mentioned in the introductory
example), or the time could be encoded numerically in the way described above.
5.3.5. Example
Figure 5.8 shows a complete ODRL expression, and Figure 5.9 shows the resulting
attribute policy after XML Extraction (reformatted for better readability). Note
that the second permission (the <o-dd:print> block) is the same as the example
of Figure 5.6, which was already discussed. Here, the media ID was taken from the
<asset> block near the beginning of the ODRL expression. In the Attribute Expan-
sion phase, the two numeric comparisons (datepassed.numerical >= 20011231
and mediasamplemedia.hasPayedFor.USD >= 20) will be expanded to their bags
of bits representation.
5.4. Implementation
The conversion process was implemented during a bachelor’s thesis project [Bra10].
Our tool takes as input an ODRL policy and a set of conversion rules as described
in the preceding sections. It converts the XML file to its DOM representation and
parses it, listing all rules contained in its agreement blocks, and identifying which
of them are enforceable according to the given conversion rules. In the next step it
applies the conversion rules and outputs all resulting attribute rules. The tool is also
able to convert rules containing a comparison of numerical attributes with constants
to comparisons with “bag of bits” representations. For example, Figure 5.10 shows
a subtree of a set of static rules before the bags of bits conversion, and Figure 5.11
shows the same tree after a bags of bits conversion. Briefly, in this example, the
numerical attribute device.network.uidnet1.version is represented as a three
bit value (encoded by six Boolean attributes), and the left side of the tree evaluates
109
5. Cryptographic Enforcement of DRM Licenses
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<o-ex:rights xmlns:o-ex="http://odrl.net/1.1/ODRL-EX
xmlns:o-dd="http://odrl.net/1.1/ODRL-DD">
<o-ex:agreement>
<o-ex:asset>
<o-ex:context>
<o-dd:uid>samplemedia</o-dd:uid>
<o-dd:name>A Sample Media</o-dd:name>
</o-ex:context>
</o-ex:asset>
<o-ex:permission>
<o-dd:play>
<o-ex:constraint>
<o-dd:group>
<o-ex:context>
<o-dd:uid>samplegroup</o-dd:uid>
</o-ex:context>
</o-dd:group>
<o-dd:datetime>
<o-dd:start>2001-12-31T00:00:00</o-dd:start>
</o-dd:datetime>
</o-ex:constraint>
</o-dd:play>
<o-dd:print>
<o-ex:requirement>
<o-dd:prepay>
<o-dd:payment>
<o-dd:amount o-dd:currency="USD">
20
</o-dd:amount>
</o-dd:payment>
</o-dd:prepay>
</o-ex:requirement>
</o-dd:print>
</o-ex:permission>
</o-ex:agreement>
</o-ex:rights>
Figure 5.8: Example ODRL expression
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(
(
user.groupmember.samplegroup AND
(
datepassed.2001-12-31 OR
datepassed.numerical >= 20011231
)
) OR
mediasamplemedia.hasPayedFor.USD >= 20
)
Figure 5.9: Attribute policy after XML Extraction phase
AND
>= device.network.uidnet1
device.network.uidnet1.version 2
Figure 5.10: Static rule as tree
to true, if any of the upper two bits (with index 1 and 2) is set to true.
In the next step, several optimizations of the tree are performed, like joining
adjacent AND/OR nodes or removing unneeded nodes. Finally, in order to be
usable with an existing implementation of the DABE construction of Section 3.4,
the tree is converted to its DNF representation. Due to the simple structure of
ODRL policies this final conversion can be done efficiently, and the resulting DNF
trees are usually quite small.
The implementation was written in Java, using JDOM to access the DOM
representation of ODRL policies and SableCC [E´ti98] as a parser generator, which
was needed to process the large number of more than 100 conversion rules that
were created to support all relevant fields of ODRL. For details, we refer the reader
to Appendix B of the bachelor thesis [Bra10].
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Data type Attribute type Example
Numerical Numerical The user has paid 10 e
Date Numerical The content is usable only after January 1st, 2011
Boolean Boolean The user is a member of group “Samplegroup”
Table 5.3: Data types of implemented tool
AND
OR device.network.uidnet1
device.network.uidnet1.version[1].1 device.network.uidnet1.version[2].1
Figure 5.11: Static rule of Figure 5.10 after bags of bits conversion
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a new DRM architecture that uses Distributed
Attribute-Based Encryption to enforce policies by cryptographic means. We
argued that this not only allows stronger security claims, as we do not rely on
a trusted reference monitor anymore, but may in many cases also remove the
necessity of a user license creation process by the rights issuer by instead using the
publishing license. This greatly simplifies the architecture of a DRM system and
reduces network load.
Taking OMA DRM as an example architecture, we have then identified those
ODRL expressions that can be cryptographically enforced through ABE and
proposed a framework that automatically extracts the enforceable policies from
ODRL expressions as Boolean attribute policies and encodes them. This allows to
implement a DRM scheme where an enforceable attribute policy is automatically
extracted from an ODRL expression. This attribute policy can in turn be used as
input to a DABE scheme which encrypts the title key with the policy.
We also implemented an extraction utility that can be used as part of a complete
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DRM framework and described implementation details, showing specifically how
such a conversion process can be done.
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Chapter6
Attribute-Based Encryption in SOA
6.1. Introduction
The application of attribute-based encryption is particularly attractive in dis-
tributed settings. DABE shows its strengths when a large number of parties are
present and central trusted authorities are undesired. Such settings are commonly
found in Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA). In SOA, functionality is provided
through standardized services. A service is initiated by a service request message
that is sent to a service provider and contains all information about the request.
This request triggers the functionality on the provider’s site. The provider then
replies with the result of the service with another standardized message, the service
result. (This chapter will only briefly introduce SOA concepts. For a more thorough
introduction, we refer to [Erl08].) Obviously, the results of a service request must
adhere to certain privacy requirements. In this chapter we use the SOA setting as
an example to take a more detailed look on how data-centric security with DABE
can be implemented. (Note that many of the results here are also applicable to
other variants of ABE.) We describe technical details like attribute revocation and
the creation of LSSS matrices that we have mentioned only briefly in the preceding
chapters.
The core object of SOA is the SOAP message [W3C07]. Such messages usually
contain data, i.e., documents, but may also have RPC-like information (i.e., active
objects). In a typical SOA setting, all messages exchanged between parties follow
the SOAP standard, and from a security perspective it should be ensured that
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SOAP messages are only accessible to eligible users. For example, if a service
requester is a company that uses a service to acquire some sensitive information that
is needed for a certain project, then the service results should be accessible by some,
but not all employees of the company. These eligible employees can be described
by a policy. However, due to the highly distributed nature of SOA scenarios and
the potentially very high number of requests, a central policy enforcement point
would quickly become a bottleneck.
It appears natural to utilize ABE to improve both efficiency and security in SOA,
but several obstacles make this difficult: In this chapter, we show that DABE, as
opposed to conventional CP-ABE fits the highly distributed setting of SOA very
well.
For the SOA setting, we also take a look at the of problem of attribute revocation:
When a property of a user, represented by one of his attributes, changes, he must
lose the ability to access any encrypted message for which the revoked attribute
would be needed. While there are some constructions that support variants of
this idea [YWRL10b], they are limited in several ways, and it is unclear what
kinds of revocation are actually possible in the specific settings of Attribute-Based
Encryption. We show that although attribute revocation is problematic under
the flexible scenario of the ABE schemes, DABE allows for a deterministic and
well-defined revocation mechanism, and we describe the infrastructure needed for
it.
WS-Security is commonly used to describe access control policies [JSGI09].
However, the WS-Security standard [OAS06] does not take into account the special
features and implications of cryptographic types of access control, such as ABE.
Nevertheless, we show that WS-Security is well-suited for ABE policies and can
easily be extended to allow DABE policies to be embedded in WS-Security.
Finally, we show that nearly all expensive calculations of common ABE schemes
can be outsourced to third parties which can help the decryption without gaining
any information about the encrypted messages. These third parties will be denoted
access gates as they are able to enforce a policy (i.e., do access control) but need not
be completely trusted. Even if these gates are corrupted or under full control of an
attacker, they are not able to violate the policies encoded in the ciphertexts, and no
information about the encrypted messages is leaked. Of course, an attacker could
shut down corrupted access gates completely, so they do not offer any functionality
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anymore. In that case, a decryptor can choose a different access gate. In regard
to that property, we model access gates as honest-but-curious for our analysis, so
we consider them willing to do the functionality but interested to gain as much
information as possible. We show that no part of the encrypted data is revealed to
access gates.
6.1.1. Related Work
In his dissertation, Shucheng Yu [Yu10] discussed the applicability of ABE for
cloud computing (also published as [YWRL10a]), and his work was later extended
by Jeong-Min Do et. al. [DSP11]. This setting bears some similarities to SOA.
However, only KP-ABE was considered in these papers. A cloud computing setting
was also considered in [LWG11]. In the short paper [LbHC10], it is briefly shown
how conventional single-authority CP-ABE can be included in WS-Security. We
expand on these ideas.
When using ABE for any setting, one must choose a specific construction that
implements all required features. In our SOA setting we use DABE, and more
specifically the construction of Section 3.5.
We note that in [LW11], the authors propose a CP-ABE scheme similar to DABE
that does not need any central authority as there are no secret user keys. We do
not consider this a useful addition in most practical scenarios for the following
reasons:
1. Everybody who gets a suitable set of attribute keys is able to decrypt messages,
so all attribute keys must be delivered through a secure (encrypted) channel.
In DABE systems with a secret user key, the secret attribute keys can be
delivered unencrypted, as they are of no use to anybody who has no access
to the secret user key. We will use this feature later in this chapter when we
introduce Access Gates. This means that while [LW11] offers the advantage
of requiring one key less (the secret user key) than DABE, it suffers from the
disadvantage of having all other keys delivered in a much more expensive
way.
2. For most practical scenarios, a user’s eligibility of an attribute requires
authentication, so each user needs to have an identity that can be verified
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by using a trusted authority. Also, to build a secure channel, the decryptor
needs a unique key which cannot be maintained outside of the system, so
the proposed advantage seems to be only of theoretical nature.
3. The ciphertexts are 50% larger as three group elements are required for
each row of the LSSS matrix, whereas the construction we use requires only
two group elements per row. Also, for the reduction proof to work, the
construction requires very large groups of order p1p2p3 for p1, p2, p3 being
large primes. This makes all group elements much larger.
Outline. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: First we discuss
attributes in a global setting in Section 6.2. We take a detailed look on how to
implement the crucial functionalities of encryption (Section 6.3) and decryption
(Section 6.4). Finally, we describe the complete SOA system in Section 6.5. We
conclude the chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2. Attributes
6.2.1. Unified Naming Scheme
In a multi-authority setting as described by DABE, each attribute authority is
responsible for its own universe of attributes and the encryptors decide which
authorities they trust (see our description of DABE in Section 3.2). From a
technical point of view, each authority may have its own way of naming attributes.
Nonetheless, from a usage point of view it may be desirable to have a unified
naming scheme that all authorities follow. Consider the naming scheme we used
in the preceding chapter, for example
device.network.ip
Here, the naming follows a hierarchical pattern, where the name starts with a
specifier of the domain (i.e., device, meaning that the attribute is concerned with
a device), followed by a specifier of a more specific sub-domain (i.e., network),
followed by the name (i.e., ip).
We propose a similar naming scheme for the DABE setting. Attribute names
are prefixed by the authority URI to make them unique. The delimiters shall be /
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characters instead of dots. Similar to web services we also prepend the http://
prefix to all attribute names, making each attribute name a valid URL. Such
a URL could be used to point to resources that provide information about the
attribute, for example explaining what property it represents, its semantics and
how a user can prove his eligibility. We discuss this process later in Section 6.4.1.
For example, an attribute that specifies the memory size in gigabytes and is
managed by an attribute authority identified by http://www.someauthority.com
might look like this:
http://www.someauthority.com/device/memory/size/gb/
Note that we also added an additional slash character at the end. This last /
marks the end of the attribute name. We will later use this feature to append
additional information about the attribute (that is not part of the name) after
that character.
It is noteworthy that we consider the name of the attribute authority part of
the attribute name. For example, an attribute
http://www.authority1.com/user/role/admin/
while having a similar meaning is different from the attribute
http://www.authority2.com/user/role/admin/
In both cases, the user is supposed to be an administrator, but probably for different
domains. He may request the admin attribute from the respective authority, but it
only certifies his role within the specified domain.
Numerical attributes. Inspired by the Hungarian notation [Klu88] we propose
to append the information on the bit length to the attribute name, followed by the
bags of bits qualifiers that we introduced in Section 5.3.4. A complete attribute
name might then look like this:
http://www.someauthority.com/device/memory/size/gb/i8[2].1
This specific attribute specifies that the bit with index 2 of the 8 bit value is set.
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6.2.2. Revocation
Revocation is frequently used in the context of Digital Rights Management infras-
tructures. Here, certain user keys can be revoked, making the respective users
unable to access (i.e., decrypt) documents. This is very useful because over time
user properties change and user may lose some of their access rights. We now
discuss how this can be applied to ABE.
In DABE, access is restricted not by users but by their properties, so the meaning
of revocation changes: If a user loses a certain property, this property is called
revoked, and it the future, he must be unable to access objects that require this
property, even if he was able to access them before the revocation took place. In
settings with a single trusted authority that controls all accesses, this is easy to
accomplish as the authority can simply deny users access.
For ABE, where an access attempt is equal to a decryption attempt, things get
a bit more complicated. In [YWRL10b], the authors try to solve the revocation
problem in the ABE case by proposing a CP-ABE construction that supports
efficient proxy re-encryption. The idea is that whenever an attribute gets revoked,
the master key components of that attribute are changed and all stored ciphertexts
are re-encrypted, forcing future users to request an updated secret attribute key.
This new attribute key will only be given to users that are still eligible. In effect,
a new attribute is introduced that takes on the role of the old one but is only
given to non-revoked users. However, this solution is negligent of the fact that
in the ABE setting, ciphertexts are stored on untrusted media. (Note that if
the storage is on trusted media, there is usually no need for a cryptographically
expensive technology as ABE, as trusted storage entities can also be trusted to do
conventional access control.) Untrusted storage can not be trusted to delete the
old versions of the ciphertexts that can still be decrypted with the old attribute
keys. This observation about revocation of data stored on untrusted media is true
for most revocation mechanisms. Even in broadcast encryption schemes [NNL01]
commonly used in DRM architectures1, revocation is only effective for data created
after the revocation event took place.
While we cannot circumvent this limitation, we can use the idea of changing
attribute keys in order to revoke attributes, but note that this only has an effect
1Such as AACS, http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/
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on newly encrypted content as we cannot be sure that old data is always re-
encrypted. Our revocation mechanism works as follows: Whenever an attribute
is revoked for a set of users, the respective attribute authority creates a new
attribute key pair. This should be reflected in the attribute name, for example, by
appending a sequential number. For example, an attribute that represents a user’s
eligibility to access movies of a site could be initially called moviedownload/1/.
The respective keys are given to all eligible users. After a revocation, a new
attribute called moviedownload/2/ is issued. From that point in time, the old
attribute moviedownload/1/ is not used anymore, and all newly created movies
are encrypted using the new keys. The corresponding secret attribute key is given
to all users that are still eligible, but not to revoked users. This way, revoked users
cannot access the newly encoded documents anymore. Note that to implement
this efficiently, the underlying ABE construction is required to support incremental
attribute claims (DABE explicitly is).
Instead of sequential numbers, it can be more useful to periodically update
attributes and reflect the validity period in the attribute names. For example, an
attribute name could look like this:
http://www.someauthority.com/subscription/moviedownload/2011-10/
A user who has an attribute key corresponding to this attribute is eligible to
download movies encrypted in October 2011. If the user’s subscription ends in
October, he is not able to decode movies encrypted after that date anymore, as
he will not get the corresponding key for November. The effect of this is that his
subscription property is revoked.
6.3. Encryption
6.3.1. Incorporating CP-ABE into WS-Security
In [LbHC10], the authors propose a SOAP format that supports encoding data
directly encrypted with CP-ABE. Unfortunately, the approach is limited: ABE
is computationally very expensive and usually described in terms of encrypting
a single group element of a group GT . For all practical purposes, one will use
a hybrid encryption where only a symmetric key is encrypted with ABE, and
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the actual data is encrypted symmetrically with that key. Also, instead of using
established XML and SOA standards, the authors introduce their own headers.
Our approach is as follows: The core standard that allows for security claims in
SOAP messages is WS-Security [OAS06]. (For a good introduction to WS-Security
we refer to [KC08], which we implicitly use as source for most of the technical claims
in this section.) To support encrypted documents, WS-Security commonly uses
the W3C recommendation XML Encryption Syntax and Processing [IDS02] that
supports several powerful ways to encrypt XML data, including hybrid encryption
properties by using an element called EncryptedKey. This element is used to
transport (usually symmetric) encryption keys. The information on how to decrypt
such an EncryptedKey can be stored in an element called EncryptionProperties.
Note that there are standards that deal with general policies (i.e., WS-Policy
[W3C06]) and security policies (WS-SecurityPolicy [LK07]), but we do not use
these, as we are only concerned with access policies written as Boolean formulas
and these standards were tailored for a much more general case.
Figure 6.1 shows an example of a SOAP message encrypted with DABE using
the policy discussed earlier in Section 3.1. Briefly, the SOAP header (lines 8–29)
contains a symmetric key encrypted with DABE using the policy depicted in lines
9–14. For simplicity we omit the public keys of the system and instead consider a
system were the public key (including the URI of the Central Authority) is publicy
known. The EncryptedKey element references both the policy (line 25) and the
actual encrypted message (line 22). After decrypting the symmetric key, it can be
used to decrypt the actual message that is contained in the SOAP message body
(lines 31–41). In this example, AES was used for symmetric encryption (see line
33).
In our architecture, the decryptor processes the policy and examines if he can
satisfy it. If he needs to have more attributes, he invokes a web service to query an
attribute authority for a specific secret attribute key, for example for the attribute
http://www.openid.org/user/is18OrOlder. We get into more detail on this in
the following section. If he satisfies the policy, he decrypts the symmetric key
using the DABE construction and then uses the symmetric key to decrypt the
actual message. How such an encrypted message is encoded is specified by the
core standards and can be done with conventional web service tools.
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF8"?>
2 <SOAP -ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP -ENV="http:// schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap
/envelope/">
3 <SOAP -ENV:Header >
4 <wsse:Security
5 xmlns:wsse="http: //docs.oasis -open.org/wss /2004/01/ oasis -...
6 xmlns:xenc="http: //www.w3.org /2001/04/ xmlenc#">
7
8 <wsse:BinarySecurityToken Id="abe -policy">
9 http://db.mycompany.org/user/role/admin OR
10 http://db.mycompany.org/user/permissions/fullAccess OR
11 ( http: //www.openid.org/user/is18OrOlder AND
12 ( http://www.contprov1.com/article/byid /1234/ hasPaidFor OR
13 http: //www.contprov2.com/article/byid /4325/ hasPaidFor OR
14 http: //www.contprov3.com/article/byid/ABC/hasPurchased ) )
15 </wsse:BinarySecurityToken >
16 <xenc:EncryptedKey xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org /2001/04/ xmlenc#
">
17 <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="wsdabe" />
18 <xenc:CipherData >
19 <xenc:CipherValue >
sMqPjXpGrM24SsmP8NVXJ1WhWuudpim9TjtsNzeWvrShNgytPoYx6GH0v27xvZu
</ xenc:CipherValue >
20 </xenc:CipherData >
21 <xenc:ReferenceList >
22 <xenc:DataReference URI="#Enc1"/>
23 </xenc:ReferenceList >
24 <wsse:securityTokenReference >
25 <wsse:Reference URI="#abe -policy" />
26 </wsse:securityTokenReference >
27 </xenc:EncryptedKey >
28 </xsse:Securiy >
29 </SOAP -Env:Header >
30
31 <SOAP -Env:Body >
32 <xenc:EncryptedData xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org /2001/04/ xmlenc#
" Id="Enc1" Type="http: //www.w3.org /2001/04/ xmlenc#Content">
33 <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org /2001/04/
xmlenc#aes -192-cbc"/>
34 <xenc:CipherData >
35 <xenc:CipherValue >
36 cU5vDITPk78thObr7AxoEsHTkdp2VOsTDSJEnkNMMj4jbhkdRUpNK6QbcEAoM
37 RvYVEZDPKbCPrBfvvyMkCuXNkUJ6T5YN1DSKKoooG8zNXNsUHcTm9ghX8Dr67
38 </xenc:CipherValue >
39 </xenc:CipherData >
40 </xenc:EncryptedData >
41 </SOAP -ENV:Body >
42 </SOAP -ENV:Envelope >
Figure 6.1: Sample DABE-encrypted SOAP object
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6.3.2. Preparing an Encryption
In order to protect a document, the encryptor must decide on the policy, and for
each attribute he must choose one attribute authority he trusts that is able to
specify the attribute. As described in Chapter 3, he needs public attribute keys for
all attributes that he uses in the policy. Note that if a single-authority scenario
is deployed and no incremental attribute claims are required, a conventional CP-
ABE construction like [BSW07] may be used. In such single-authority CP-ABE
constructions, public attribute keys are generated by computing a publicly know
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G (with G a bilinear group) that maps an attribute
name to a group element.
In this chapter, we realize attribute claims through web services. Figure 6.2
shows an example for an attribute claim in SOAP for the attribute http://www.au-
thority1.com/user/role/admin/ (see line 10). The web services are defined in a
file wsdabe.wsdl that is referenced in line 7 of the code. The result of such a claim
is shown in Figure 6.3. It consists of a structure of type ws:publicAttributeKey
that has the fields name (the name of the attribute) and pka (the actual public
key encoded as base 64 of a string representation of the key2). The encryptor can
decode this to a binary string and use this binary string to create a new element t
value that represents the public attribute key PKA = gHSKa (a) for attribute PKA.
This value can be used as input for the encryption function.
6.4. Decryption
6.4.1. Preparing a Decryption
Managing identities and user keys. Everybody can request a user key pair from
the central authority. In our framework, there is a single service getUserKeyPair
that takes no argument and returns a new user key pair. It is the only service
offered by the central authority. There must be a connection between the public
user key PK u and the user identity u. For example, the user could sign PK u using
a signature key that is bound to him by means of a certificate that is propagated
through an established PKI. It is also possible to bind PK u to some pseudonyms
2In our implementation that is described in Section 6.5.4, we use the return value of libpbc’s
function element to bytes.
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <SOAP -ENV:Envelope
3 xmlns:SOAP -ENV="http: // schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
4 xmlns:SOAP -ENC="http: // schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
5 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
6 xmlns:xsd="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema"
7 xmlns:ws="http: // localhost:8080/wsdabe.wsdl">
8 <SOAP -ENV:Body SOAP -ENV:encodingStyle="http:// schemas.xmlsoap.org
/soap/encoding/">
9 <ws:getPublicAttributeKey >
10 <name>http: //www.authority1.com/user/role/admin/</name>
11 </ws:getPublicAttributeKey >
12 </SOAP -ENV:Body >
13 </SOAP -ENV:Envelope >
Figure 6.2: Sample public attribute key request
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <SOAP -ENV:Envelope
3 xmlns:SOAP -ENV="http: // schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
4 xmlns:SOAP -ENC="http: // schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
5 xmlns:xsi="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
6 xmlns:xsd="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema"
7 xmlns:ws="http: // localhost:8080/wsdabe.wsdl">
8 <SOAP -ENV:Body SOAP -ENV:encodingStyle="http:// schemas.xmlsoap.org
/soap/encoding/">
9 <ws:publicAttributeKey >
10 <name>http: //www.authority1.com/user/role/admin/</name>
11 <pka>RGllIEhvZmZudW5nIGlzdCBkaWUgU+
R1bGUsIHdlbGNoZSBkaWUgV2VsdCB0cuRndC4 </pka>
12 </ws:publicAttributeKey >
13 </SOAP -ENV:Body >
14 </SOAP -ENV:Envelope >
Figure 6.3: Sample public attribute key result
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in order to achieve anonymity when dealing with certain services.
To be able to do this, a slight modification is required. This modification works
for both DABE constructions we proposed in Chapter 3: For each ith pseudonym
a user u wants to create, he chooses a random bi ∈ Z∗p and computes his ith
public user key PK
(i)
u as PK
(i)
u := PK
bi
u . For example, a user could create an
(anonymous) account on a license provider site and associate it with his second
pseudonymous public user key PK (2)u = PK
b2
u for some random b2. Whenever he
buys something with this account, the license provider site offers an attribute
representing this purchase and personalizes it for PK (2)u , returning a secret attribute
key SK
(2)
A,u = (PK
(2)
u )
HSKa(A) (as explained in the RequestAttributeSK algorithms).
The user can now raise this value to the power b−12 to retrieve a valid secret
attribute key SKA,u for his real user key PK u without ever having revealed PK u
to the attribute authority:
(SK
(2)
A,u)
b−12 = (PK (2)u )
b−12 HSKa(A) = PK
HSKa(A)
u = SKA,u .
The effect of this is that although the user u does not reveal his true identity
to the site, he is still able to use the attributes together with his other attributes.
Getting attributes using different identities is desirable in many scenarios. For
example, an attribute like http://www.openid.org/user/is18OrOlder probably
requires the respective attribute authority to know the user’s real identity, while
he might prefer to use only a pseudonym when acquiring other attributes. Due to
the DABE construction, the user can freely mix attributes gained under his true
identity with attributes gained under pseudonyms.
Requesting secret attribute keys. Using his public user key the user can now
request secret attribute keys. To issue these secret user keys, an attribute authority
must have a way to decide if user represented by his PK u is actually eligible
of the attribute. As we have described, this decision can be based on the user
identity or on a pseudonym. How this works in particular may vary greatly between
the many different possible types and domains of attributes, so the details are
beyond the scope of this work. However, in general we can describe this process
as a communication protocol where the authority request a set of information
from the user that proves his eligibility. This protocol may contain, for example,
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<message name="getSecretAttributeKey">
<part name="name" type="xsd:string" />
<part name="usertoken" type="xsd:string" />
<part name="pku" type="xsd:string" />
</message>
Figure 6.4: WSDL definition of getSecretAttributeKey service
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Figure 6.5: Determining missing attributes
challenge-response steps that let the user prove his possession of certain keys or
other means of convincing the authority of a property. The last step is the sending
of the actual secret attribute key. Figure 6.4 is a WSDL description of such a final
message, denoted getSecretAttributeKey. It contains the name of the attribute
as well as some usertoken that identifies the result of the communication protocol
and the public user key pku of the user. The usertoken may be as simple as a
user identity or the session key of a session opened between the authority and
the user, where he proved his eligibility. In order to have the greatest possible
versatility, we do not limit the format of this token.
Determining how to satisfy the policy. In a typical system, a user may be
eligible to a large number of attributes, but he only needs to request secret
attribute keys required for the ciphertexts he wants to decrypt. Whenever a user
receives a ciphertext, he analyses the policy to see if his current set of secret
attribute keys satisfies it or if he needs to request more keys.
If he does not satisfy the policy, it is useful to give him some representation
describing possible steps that he can do to satisfy it. Such a representation can
directly be done by removing all parts of the policy that the user already satisfies.
To illustrate this, we give a short example: Consider the syntax tree in Fig-
ure 6.5(a) that represents a ciphertext policy and assume that the decryptor only
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has secret attribute keys for the attributes C and D. The decryptor automatically
removes these nodes (by replacing them with > and simplifying the resulting tree)
and gets the tree shown in Figure 6.5(b). It shows not only that the policy is not
(yet) satisfied, but also tells the decryptor that to be able to decrypt, he needs to
acquire secret attribute keys for either both A and B or for E. This tree may be
displayed to the decryptor to help him decide on his next steps.
6.4.2. Access Gates
When a ciphertext policy is satisfied, the ciphertext can be decrypted. As decryp-
tion is the most expensive process of ABE constructions, we now briefly take a
look at the computational cost of this process and propose a new concept that
allows to improve the efficiency in many cases:
Implementations of pairing-based cryptosystems on smart cards [SCA06], mobile
phones [KTO06], and even wireless sensor nodes [SKSC09] have shown that the
technology is feasible. However, the actual pairing operation is about 150-500
times slower than even inversion, which is the slowest commonly used operation
within public-key cryptography (see especially Table 1 of [KTO06] and Table 5
of [SKSC09]), a single pairing operation being approximately as expensive as a
complete RSA exponentiation [SCA06]. While we have already proposed a CP-ABE
construction that requires only two pairing operations in Section 3.4, in all other
known constructions the number of pairing operations in the decryption function
is in O(n), where n is the number of attributes used for the decryption. (Note
that in some constructions like [NYO09] all attributes are used for decryption, so
in these cases n denotes the number of attributes in the system.)
As the parties accessing ABE protected documents may be light-weight, it is
important to look for ways to speed up decryption. In this section, we show that in
most common CP-ABE constructions decryption can be seen as a two-step process
and that the first step, which is the computationally expensive part, can be done
by a third party without compromising security. We consider such third parties as
“honest, but curious” as introduced in [dVFJ+07] and denote them Access Gates.
Figure 6.6 gives an overview of the involved parties and their relationships.
We note that these findings apply to many CP-ABE constructions, for example all
of [MKE09, LOS+10, NYO09, ZH10, CN07]. (Recently, in [GHW11], the authors
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Figure 6.6: Overview of SOA architecture
proposed a modification of [Wat11] that achieves a similar speed up. However,
their modification is more expensive, probably in debt of their security proof, while
we show how to directly apply the speed up without modifying the constructions at
all. Also, as explained, unlike [GHW11] our result is more general and applicable
to several CP-ABE constructions.)
In most CP-ABE constructions, the message is encrypted with a formula of the
following type:
C = MY s ,
where M is the plaintext message, Y is a publicly known system parameter of the
form Y = e(g1, g2)
y for generators g1, g2 (in the symmetric case, g1 = g2), some
random value y chosen during system setup, and a random value s decided on by
the encryptor during the encryption process.
The only way to decrypt the ciphertext and recover M is to find the value of
Y s and compute M = C/Y s. This is done with an elaborate computation process
where the decryptor’s attribute keys are combined with ciphertext components in
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a way specific to the ciphertext policy. The ciphertext components used in the
step are not related to the original value M in any way, as they are only used
to recover Y s. To prevent collusions, all attribute keys are blinded with a user
specific value, so they are not compatible with attribute keys from a different user,
so the actual result is Y s blinded by this user specific value, too.
This is why the decryptor has another secret key that is used to unblind the
result of the computation, which we call the unblinding key. This unblinding step
is different for each construction, but usually it requires a single pairing operation
which has as input the unblinding key and another ciphertext component. Before
this step, the data can be considered to be still encrypted, with the unblinding key
being the decryption key. After unblinding, the value of Y s is obtained, and M
can be decrypted.
Note that without the unblinding key, one ends up with encrypted data, so having
only the attribute key is not enough to decrypt. On the other hand, the unblinding
key is not needed in the first part of the decryption process at all, so anyone who
has the attribute keys can compute this part without learning anything about M ,
while the attribute keys are not needed to compute the second part that requires
only a constant number of computation steps using the unblinding key.
This means that the two steps can be done separately by two parties. The
first party (the access gate) has access to the user’s attribute keys and does
the expensive first part of the decryption, ending up with a partially encrypted
ciphertext that does not contain information that it can use to recover M . In fact,
for some constructions it may not even need to have access to the single ciphertext
component C that is dependent on the plaintext message M . The decryptor needs
only the unblinding key to be able to complete the decryption.
We will not go into too many cryptographic details here but give an intuition by
showing how access gates can be realized for two ABE constructions. For example,
in our DABE construction, the complete decryption step is:
M = C ·
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci, PKu) · e(Di, SKρ(i),u)
)ωi
e(C ′, SKu)
.
Note that only the secret attribute keys and the public user key are used for
computing the numerator of the right-hand fraction, while the secret user key is
used to compute the denominator. This observation gives us an intuition how to
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realize access gates for this construction. If – as explained – the secret attribute
keys are given to the access gate, decryption can be split up into two separate
steps as follows:
Access Gate: The access gate knows the public user key PK u as well as the secret
attribute keys SKA,u for the same user u, but it has no access to the secret
user key SK u. Using the ciphertext components Ci and Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ `, it
computes constants {ωi|i ∈ I}, such that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s and creates M
′ as
follows:
M ′ =
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci, PKu) · e(Di, SKρ(i),u)
)ωi = e(g, P )smku .
(For details on this equation we refer to the correctness proof of the respective
construction in Section 3.5.1.) Note that the result of this computation is not
related to M , as during encryption M was only used in C = Me(g,Q)s, while
the ciphertext components Ci and Di are independent of M . Also note that
the only way to compute M from C is by dividing it by e(g,Q)s. However,
the access gate cannot recover this value using M ′ because M ′ is blinded:
Instead of having e(g,Q)s, the access gate has computed e(g, P )smku . One
more value, the secret user key SK u is needed to complete the decryption.
Decryptor: Using his secret user key SK u = MK · Pmku , the decryptor is able to
decrypt the message:
M = C · M
′
e(C ′, SKu)
Obviously, the computation time is constant and requires one pairing opera-
tion, one inversion in GT and two multiplications in GT .
The same steps can also be applied to the decryption operations of [LOS+10] and
[Wat11].
To give another example, [ZH10] proposes a CP-ABE construction with a very
interesting property: While the ciphertext policies are restricted to a single AND
gate (similar to [CN07] and [NYO09]), the ciphertext size is constant, consisting of
only two group elements. In this construction, access gates are especially interesting
as each user has one key component for each attribute in the system and all these
components are required for each decryption. By storing these key components
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remotely on an access gate and only giving the user key component (denoted D0
in the paper) to the user, both space and time efficiency can be improved. The
decryption step again can be split up into to separate steps.
Access Gate: For each attribute of the system, each user has a secret key compo-
nent Di. These values are given to the access gate, but the value D (that
we can view as the secret user key) is kept secret by the user. With public
keys gi for all i and the ciphertext component C1, the step performed by the
access gate is:
M ′ =
∏
i
e(gi, C1)/e(C0, Di ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gK+1−j+i) .
As before, the result M ′ of this computation is an intermediate result that
contains the decryption key but is blinded with a value that the access gate
does not know and can not remove using the values it knows. One more
value, the secret user key D is needed to complete the decryption.
Decryptor: The decryptor needs the intermediate value M ′ as well as the secret key
component D and the ciphertext component C0 to recover M by computing
M = M ′ · e(D,C0) .
Again, this computation is very inexpensive, requiring only one pairing
operation and one multiplication, so it can be done efficiently even on a
resource constrained device in reasonable time.
6.5. Description of System
We now describe each of the parties involved in our system as depicted in Figure 6.6,
the services they offer, and briefly discuss our proof-of-concept implementation.
6.5.1. Central Authority
The central authority is the only party that knows the system’s master key. As
explained before, the public system key PK is supposed to publicly available to all
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parties, and it is not explicitly distributed by the central authority. So the only
service offered by the central authority is the creation of new user key pairs as
discussed in Section 6.4.1:
Service getUserKeyPair
Input: (Nothing)
Output: Public and secret user key (PK u, SK u)
Create a new user key pair and return it. Both public and secret user keys are
single elements of the group G, and can be represented by a string of characters
as explained above. The user will later send the encoded public user key to
attribute authorities. However, for the decryption functionality he needs to
convert the string representation of the secret user key into a cryptographic
value. To do this, he needs to acquire the public system parameters that describe
the cryptographic groups used in the system.
Note: The response of this service has to be secure against eavesdroppers.
The authenticity of the central authority can easily be verified by testing if the
user key pair is valid in the context of the public system key. This is done as
follows: Given the public key components P and e(g,Q) and the public user
key PK u compute: e(g,Q) · e(PK u, P ). If the result is equal to e(g, SK u) for
the secret user key SK u, then (PK u, SK u) is a valid key pair.
The test is correct as for any well-formed user key pair it holds that with
PK u = g
mku ,
e(g,Q) · e(gmku , P ) = e(g,Q) · e(g, Pmku) = e(g,Q · Pmku) = e(g, SK u) .
6.5.2. Attribute Authority
Service getPublicAttributeKey
Input: Attribute name A
Output: Public attribute key PKA
This service returns a public attribute key for the given attribute. The key is
a single element of the group G, and can be represented by a single string of
characters as explained above.
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Service getSecretAttributeKey
Input: Attribute name A, user token u, and public user key PK u
Output: Secret attribute key SKA,u
This service returns a secret attribute key for the given attribute, personalized
for the user with the given public user key. The service only returns a valid key
if the user (identified by the user token) is eligible of the attribute key. This is
discussed in Section 6.4.1.
6.5.3. Access Gates
Service storeAttribute
Input: User id u, secret attribute key SKA,u
Output: (Nothing)
Stores the secret attribute key, associated with the given user id in the access
gate’s attribute database. The access gate does not need to verify the secret
attribute key. Interestingly, the gate can verify if two secret attribute keys belong
to the same user (even if the secret attribute keys are from different authorities):
Note that given two secret attribute keys for the same user SKA1,u from an
authority a1 and SKA2,u from an authority a2, as well as the respective public
attribute keys PKA1 and PKA2 , it holds that
e(PKA1 , SKA2,u) = e(g, g)
mkuHSKa1
(A1)HSKa2 (A2) = (PKA2 , SKA1,u) .
This equation is not true if the secret attribute keys are associated with different
users. This feature can be used as a simple sanity check that may be used to
avert the storage of invalid keys.
Service decryptPartial
Input: ABE ciphertext (CT ,A), user id u
Output: Modified ciphertext M ′
Returns a modified ciphertext that can be decrypted by using only a secret user
key.
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To this end, the access gate applies all secret user keys that it has stored for the
given user id to the partial decryption formula (see Section 6.4.2). The result of
this is a ciphertext that can be decrypted by the secret user key corresponding
to the secret attribute keys.
6.5.4. Implementation
To implement pairing-based algorithms, we use the libpbc [Lyn], which in turn is
based on the GNU MP Bignum library3. As we also require symmetric cryptography,
we use the cryptographic libraries supplied by the OpenSSL Project4. The result
of all the cryptographic functionality is a library libdabe. This library is able to
convert between cryptographic keys stored in libpbc format and binary strings,
such that the interface does not rely on cryptographic libraries and uses only char*
elements and the dependencies of libdabe are invisible to the parts of the code
that implement the actual web services.
All web services were written using the gsoap toolkit5, where the services were
described in a C .h header file and then converted into WSDL descriptions by the
gsoap compiler as well as C interfaces to use. See Figure 6.7 for an excerpt from the
generated WSDL definitions. Specifically, the excerpt exemplarily shows the parts
that are relevant for the definition of the service getPublicAttributeKey that we
already described above. Using these definitions, we implemented server programs
for central and attribute authorities as well as a test client that interacted with
them.
All services could be realized directly using gsoap without any modifications,
using interfaces that conform to the libraries and the standards. Building a
complete library from this proof-of-concept implementation is straightforward.
This shows that DABE for SOA as developed in this chapter is feasible and can be
incorporated smoothly into existing projects using modular software components.
The current reliance on three cryptographic libraries in addition to the DABE
functions may be mitigated in the future as pairings-based cryptography matures
and more complete libraries are developed.
3http://gmplib.org/
4http://www.openssl.org/
5http://www.cs.fsu.edu/~engelen/soap.html
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <definitions name="wsdabe"
3 targetNamespace="http://localhost:8080/wsdabe.wsdl"
4 xmlns:tns="http://localhost:8080/wsdabe.wsdl"
5 [...]
6 xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/">
7 <types>
8 <schema targetNamespace="http://localhost:8080/wsdabe.wsdl"
9 [...]
10 elementFormDefault="unqualified"
11 attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
12 <import namespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"/>
13 <complexType name="getPublicAttributeKeyResponse">
14 <sequence>
15 <element name="name" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1" nillable="true"/>
16 <element name="pka" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs
="1" nillable="true"/>
17 </sequence>
18 </complexType>
19 [...]
20 </schema>
21 </types>
22 <message name="getPublicAttributeKey">
23 <part name="name" type="xsd:string"/>
24 </message>
25 [...]
26 <portType name="wsdabePortType">
27 <operation name="getPublicAttributeKey">
28 <documentation>Returns public attribute key for the given
attribute</documentation>
29 <input message="tns:getPublicAttributeKey"/>
30 <output message="tns:getPublicAttributeKeyResponse"/>
31 </operation>
32 [...]
33 </portType>
34 <binding name="wsdabe" type="tns:wsdabePortType">
35 <SOAP:binding style="rpc" transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.
org/soap/http"/>
36 <operation name="getPublicAttributeKey">
37 <SOAP:operation style="rpc" soapAction=""/>
38 <input>
39 [...]
40 </input>
41 <output>
42 [...]
43 </output>
44 </operation>
45 </definitions>
Figure 6.7: WSDABE WSDL definition (excerpt)
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6.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined how DABE can be incorporated into Service-Oriented
Architectures. To achieve good performance, we used hybrid encryption, where
the documents are encrypted symmetrically with a randomly generated key, and
only the key is encrypted with DABE.
While the relevant standards were not designed with data-centric security in
mind, we showed how we still can use them to support DABE encrypted documents
with only minor modifications.
To manage the large number of cryptographic keys required for DABE, we
implemented a number of Web Services. These services could be realized using
only standard tools, in addition to several libraries that implement the crypto-
graphic functionality. We showed how the user can even maintain a number of
pseudonymous identities, retrieve attributes for each of them and use all of them
together for his real identity.
We also extended the DABE framework with a new functionality called access
gates. Computationally weak decryptors can use such gates to outsource the most
expensive parts of the DABE decryption. The gates are secure in an honest-but-
curious model.
Finally, we described a proof-of-concept implementation that demonstrates that
the ideas proposed in the chapter are applicable to SOA settings and can be
implemented with reasonable effort.
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Conclusion
Data-centric security is a powerful and versatile concept with many possible
applications, and it has the potential to vastly improve trust in many scenarios by
removing the necessity of costly fine-grained access control and of a trusted party
to enforce accesses. With Attribute-Based Encryption, there is now a technology
that allows to realize data-centric security in an efficient way.
However, as diversified as the possible applications are, as broad are the fea-
tures that are expected from an ABE construction. Among the possible ABE
features that we discussed in thesis are different formats for the ciphertext policies,
single- vs. multi-authority, policy anonymity, and attribute revocation mechanisms.
There are also some more exotic features that we have not covered here, such as
different kinds of attribute hierarchies [LWG11, LCbHC11], user accountability
[LRZW09], conditional proxy re-encryption [ZFZ10] as well as a large number
of concepts that use attribute policies to improve other primitives like in ABBE
[JK10, ZH10, AHS05] or Worry-free encryption [SS10]. ABE constructions can
further be categorized by the underlying security assumptions and models. Thus,
when planning to use ABE in any particular setting, there is a large selection of
possible constructions, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. To date, the
Swiss Army knife of ABE has not yet been discovered, and no known construction
supports a majority of wanted features.
In this thesis we approached a number of these challenges, focussing on what
we consider relevant in practical scenarios, and we successfully tackled some
crucial challenges. We found that when considering practical applications, more
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interesting constructions are possible when allowing security proofs in the Generic
Group Model instead of restricting oneself to reduction proofs. One of the main
contributions of this work was our approach to support the multi-authority case
where an arbitrary number of independent attribute authorities is allowed to
issue secret attribute keys. In Chapter 3 we described this scenario in detail,
defined a scheme named Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption and proposed
two constructions that implement it. These constructions differ in the format of
the input policy as well as the security proof. We found a proof for the second
construction that is based on a security reduction, but had to rely on a weaker
security model to make it work, while security in the Generic Group Model of both
constructions could be proven in a model that is the strongest one used for ABE.
This gives further evidence that accepting the Generic Group Model for security
proofs allows more versatility and more powerful and efficient constructions.
In Chapter 4 we took a look at privacy issues caused by sending the ciphertext
policy in clear. Our new concept of policy anonymity allows to approach this
problem by obfuscating the policy so that an attacker cannot identify the used
policy in a candidate policy set. To this end, we introduced the notion of Syntax
Tree Majors that allow to construct suitable policy anonymity sets for any policy
expressible as a monotonic syntax tree. A modification of a know CP-ABE scheme
was then used to demonstrate the applicability of policy anonymity using syntax
tree majors.
Our examination of ABE in practical settings showed that data-centric security
is feasible not only in theory, but also from the technical point of view. While
data-centric security has its limits and cannot be used for all real-world access
policies (exemplified in a Digital Rights Management scenario), we showed that
the classification of access rules into static, i.e., cryptographically enforceable, and
dynamic ones is intuitive and that the process of separating the former from the
latter ones can be automatized easily. As an example for this we analyzed the
Open Digital Rights Language in Chapter 5 and described such an automation
process in detail.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we took the leap from theory to practice by extending
the standards used for Service Oriented Architectures with ABE technology. We
concluded that while not all standards are directly ready to express concepts
of data-centric security, modifications that add the relevant parts are possible
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without breaking compatibility with conventional access control settings. Our
implementation of relevant core services could be done using a well developed and
mature SOA framework that is widely used in the web services community.
Throughout this work we have gained an understanding about data-centric
security using ABE in practical settings: While the restriction of data-centric
security to static access rules prevents it from being a complete replacement for
conventional access control mechanisms, it can in practically all cases be used to
improve the enforcement step of access control, allowing to base security assurances
on cryptographic methods instead of trust. Using constructions as proposed in this
thesis, we have shown ABE to be a useful cryptographic primitive for IT security
and ready for implementation in real-world settings.
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